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Abstract
Increasing international flows of goods, services, and financial assets have been shown to increase a
country’s welfare through various channels. This paper studies the interaction between a country’s
welfare gains from international trade and its sovereign’s access to bond markets. We do so by in-
corporating a sovereign bond market into a simple Armington (1969)’s trade model. While standard
trade models suggest surprisingly small gains from trade, our model implies that introducing channels
through a sovereign bond market greatly magnifies the gains from trade.
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1 Introduction
Globalization has two aspects — international trade in goods and services, and international capital
mobility. Previous studies have found either of these types of globalization benefits a country. Trade
in goods and services leads to greater welfare through, for example, cross-industry or within-industry
resource reallocation, increased variety of products, and reduction of consumer prices (e.g., Costinot
and Rodríguez-Clare, 2014; and Feenstra, 2018b).1 Financial integration enhances cross-sectional and
intertemporal allocative efficiency, increases international risk sharing, and leads to faster growth and
higher standards of living (e.g., Coeurdacier et al., 2018; and Schularick and Steger, 2010).2
While previous studies have investigated the effect of international trade or financial integration in-
dependently, interactions between the two types of integration have received little attention. The goal of
this paper is to improve our understanding on how these two types of globalization interact to shape gains
from integration by focusing on international trade and an access to a sovereign bond market. This is an
empirically relevant question because the share of world trade to world GDP increased from 38 percent
to 54 percent from 1990 to 2016 according to the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2018b).
We also observe substantial amount of trade in debt — the median share of external debt stock in GNI
is 41 percent in 2016 (World Bank, 2018b).
This paper makes a simple point. As documented in previous empirical works, a loss in endowment
caused by a default reduces the sovereign’s trade with a foreign country.3 If a country experiences trade
disruption upon default, then one may reasonably think that, all other things being equal, a more open
country is less likely to default. If this is the case, a more open sovereign faces a higher price in its bond
market, since the bonds are safer for the investors. As a result, an open country receives additional gains
from trade stemming from a sovereign bond market.
These mechanisms are rigorously shown using a simple Armington (1969) two-country trade model
featuring endogenous sovereign default in incomplete bond markets, following Eaton and Gersovitz (1981),
Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), and Arellano (2008). We introduce a one-period sovereign bond that is not
state contingent and is subject to limited commitment. The sovereign has an option to default and not
pay back its debt at each period, which incurs an exogenous reduction in the endowment. Therefore, a
sovereign’s incentive to default varies substantially depending on how integrated the country is to the
international trade market in which countries trade their endowments.
There are two effects working in different directions to determine a sovereign’s incentive to default.
First, a destruction of a country’s endowment due to a default reduces the two countries’ consumption.
1Classical gains from trade come from increasing production efficiency according to countries’ comparative advantages
(David Ricardo; Eaton and Kortum, 2003). Armington (1969) and Krugman (1980) introduce the Dixit-Stigliz preferences,
therefore gains from increased variety of consumption goods. Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2014) provide a survey of
quantitative work on the welfare consequence of international trade. Feenstra (2018b) also discusses a recent literature on
sources of gains from trade.
2Coeurdacier et al. (2018) consider benefits from financial integration in a two-country neoclassical growth model, which
incorporates gains from allocative efficiency and international risk-sharing. Schularick and Steger (2010) investigate the effect
of financial integration in the first era of globalization (1880-1914) and find that an increase in capital flows across countries
led to higher growth of real GDP per capita.
3Gopinath and Neiman (2014) document that imports of Argentina collapsed in the wake of its default from 2000 to
2002. Studying samples of defaults of over 150 countries, Rose (2005) finds that trade declines persistently when a sovereign
defaults. Other empirical studies on the impact of defaults on trade flows include Martinez and Sandleris (2011), Zymek
(2012), and Asonuma et al. (2016).
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We call this the endowment effect and it works to reduce the sovereign’s inventive to default. On the
other hand, there is a positive terms of trade effect arising from a loss of endowment. A fewer supply of
goods from the defaulted country increases the relative price of the home good, which works to increase
the defaulted country’s welfare.4 This effect becomes large if the country is larger in terms of size, and
mitigates the consumption loss upon default. We demonstrate that under reasonable parameters the
former effect dominates the latter, implying that the costs of default are larger under free trade than in
autarky. As a result, as the country opens up to international trade, higher costs of default lead to a
higher bond price, enabling the sovereign to borrow more.
Therefore, trade openness reduces the sovereign’s incentive to default, leading to a lower interest rate
charged by the foreign creditors and a higher price of its bond. These mechanisms work to increase
a country’s gains from trade, because by having access to a sovereign bond market, a greater level of
openness makes the country more credible to repay its debt, making it possible to borrow more, leading
to a greater level of present value consumption and welfare. We emphasize these channels as a new source
of gains from trade.
Previous empirical evidence is consistent with our model’s predictions. Rose and Spiegel (2004)
investigate the link between bond prices and trade volumes to understand whether countries repay their
debt out of the fear that default might lead to trade disruption. They find a positive correlation between
trade volumes and the claims of sovereign bonds by the creditor country, when they looked at bilateral
trade and international banking claims from 20 creditor and 149 debtor countries in 1986-1999 period.
Moreover, Manasse and Roubini (2009) employ a panel dataset of 47 countries from the period 1970-2002
and find that a lower trade openness is one of the main predictors of sovereign debt crises. These previous
empirical results seem to suggest that sovereigns have more to lose upon default, when they become more
open to trade. Furthermore, an empirical result in Edwards (2004) is consistent with our theoretical result
that the terms of trade effect dominates in a large country.5
We also conduct empirical analyses to confirm our model’s predictions. By using a panel dataset of
144 countries between 1970 and 2013, we find that countries that were more open in 1970 had a fewer
number of defaults than less open countries during the sample period. Furthermore, results suggest that
an increase in a country’s openness reduces the bond’s interest rate and the probability of default as
consistent with the theory. We also investigate how these openness effects vary depending on the country
size measured by GDP. The model suggests that the terms of trade effect is larger for a large country,
meaning that larger countries have less to benefit from the interaction of international goods trade and the
sovereign bond market. As consistent with the model, the openness effects are greater for small countries
than for large countries. These empirical results imply that the model’s underlying mechanisms leading
to gains from trade are indeed present in reality.
Lastly, we perform a numerical exercise by calibrating the model to quantify the gains from trade. As
is conventional in the debt literature, we employ the case of Argentina for this numerical exercise.6 It also
introduces China as a foreign country because Argentina’s trade with China have increased substantially
4Our model does not include the exchange rates. Therefore, a change in terms of trade only comes from changes in supply
and demand of goods.
5Kennan and Riezman (1988) also theoretically studies the relationship between the size of a country and the terms of
trade effect in the context of the impact of imposing tariffs.
6For example, see Arellano (2008), Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), Yue (2010), Asonuma (2014), and Asonuma (2016).
3
after China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001, which is similar to our theoretical
considerations comparing the state of autarky with the one under free trade. These countries serve as
an excellent case study to quantify the gains from trade. Results imply substantial additional gains from
trade when a sovereign has access to a bond market — gains from trade become three percentage points
greater with a sovereign bond market.
This paper contributes to the literature on model-based estimation of gains from trade. An influential
paper by Arkolakis et al. (2012) shows that, in a large class of trade models, gains from trade are fully
described by a couple of statistics — share of home spending on its domestic products and elasticity of
trade with respect to variable trade costs.7 They show that the “new” trade model of heterogeneous
firms and its extensions lead to the exact same value of gains from trade as the traditional trade model.
Moreover, by applying their simple formula, they show that gains from trade for the U.S. are between 0.7
to 1.4 percent, surprisingly smaller than our intuition.
This led to a search for a realistic value of gains from trade by introducing additional channels through
which trade affects a country’s welfare.8 For example, Caliendo and Parro (2015), Melitz and Redding
(2014), and Chaney and Ossa (2013) emphasize the importance of introducing input-output linkages or
multiple production stages in amplifying gains from trade. Other studies show that a finite upper bound
for firm productivity distribution implies greater gains from trade because it makes trade elasticities to
differ across markets and trade costs (Melitz and Redding, 2015) and it restores pro-competitive effects
of trade (Feenstra, 2018a). Ossa (2015) proposes a model with multiple sectors and shows that sectoral
differences in trade elasticities significantly magnifies gains from trade. Ramanarayanan (2018) adds firms’
decisions to import intermediate goods from abroad and shows that this extra channel implies greater
gains from trade.
This paper stands in this literature on searching for gains from trade. Although these prior studies
employ either a monopolistic competition model of trade (Krugman, 1980; Melitz, 2003; and Chaney,
2008) or a perfect competition model (Eaton and Kortum, 2003), we revert to Armington (1969)’s model
where gains from trade come from increased variety of products only. We consider a novel channel through
which a country gains from trade. We incorporate a sovereign bond market in this simple model and
show that interactions between the goods market and the sovereign bond market greatly magnifies gains
from trade.
Speaking from the trade literature, we are not the first to consider international trade and finan-
cial markets jointly. Prior articles investigate how development of financial markets affects trade flows
(Manova, 2013), capital flows (Antrás and Caballero, 2009; Matsuyama, 2005), and comparative advan-
tage (Beck, 2003). However, Manova (2013) and Beck (2003) focus on a domestic financial market and
they do not consider international flows of capital. Antrás and Caballero (2009) and Matsuyama (2005)
consider foreign direct investment or foreign portfolio investment and they are silent about international
capital flows through a sovereign bond market. One exception is Kletzer and Bardhan (1987) where
they examine how cross-country differences in sovereign risk shape patterns of trade using a model with
7The class of trade models include Armington (1969), Krugman (1980), Melitz (2003), Chaney (2008), and Eaton and
Kortum (2003) where these models feature four micro-level assumptions as well as three macro-level restrictions they sum-
marize.
8Again, see Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2014) and Feenstra (2018b) for a summary of the literature on gains from
trade.
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incomplete information.
Speaking from the sovereign debt literature, there is a number of prior studies incorporating inter-
national trade in a model of sovereign debt (e.g., Mendoza and Yue, 2012; Cuadra and Sapriza, 2006;
Asonuma, 2014; and Gu, 2018). For example, Cuadra and Sapriza (2006) explore the impact of trade
openness and terms of trade shocks on a sovereign’s incentive to default or repay. While they also focus on
the terms of trade effect, their mechanism differs from ours. In their model, an exogenously given terms
of trade deterioration triggers a decline in output, leading to a smaller incentive to raise taxes to repay
its debt, resulting in a default. Asonuma (2014) and Gu (2018) also propose models to study mechanisms
a sovereign default leads to a real exchange rate depreciation and an income loss. Our focus is crucially
different from these prior studies. This paper investigates how the interactions between a sovereign bond
market and international trade generate additional gains from trade while none of these prior studies
focuses on this.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple two period model
where a sovereign issues bonds, describing two effects working in different directions to determine the
sovereign’s default costs. We empirically test the model’s theoretical predictions in Section 3. Section 4
provides numerical results. Concluding remarks are in Section 5.
2 Simple two period model
2.1 A closed economy
We start from constructing a two period model with a single endowment economy issuing one period
defaultable bonds. The setup follows that of Arellano (2008) except that the model presented in this
section has two periods only.
2.1.1 The sovereign
Consider a closed endowment economy with two periods, where a benevolent sovereign maximizes the
expected utility of the representative household. The representative household’s expected utility in the
first period is
E1 [U ] =
C1−1
1−  + βE1
[
C1−2
1− 
]
, (1)
where β is the discount factor, and  governs intertemporal substitution. In the first period, the household
has an endowment of Y1 and the sovereign agrees with foreign investors on a contract (L,D). A contract
(L,D) lets the sovereign borrow L units of consumption goods from risk neutral foreign investors in period
one, by promising that it will repay D units of consumption goods in the second period. The implied
price of the bond will be q = L/D and gross interest rate 1/q. In the second period, endowment Y2
is realized: Y2 = α + ε, where ε ∈ [−α,∞] is an i.i.d. random variable with a cumulative distribution
function denoted as F (·).
Consumption in the first period is C1 = Y1 + L. In the second period, the sovereign decides either
to repay or to default after observing a realized level of endowment. If it decides to repay, the sovereign
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will repay D as promised. If it decides to default, the sovereign does not have to repay D but it incurs a
loss of a fraction θ of its endowment.9 One way to interpret this is that a default disrupts the domestic
financial sector, by reducing banks’ wealth and by reducing banks’ access to liquid assets. Previous studies
including Perez (2015), Borensztein and Panizza (2009), Brutti (2011), and Asonuma et al. (2018) show
that a country’s default leads to a substantial decline in domestic production due to a disruption of its
domestic financial sector.
Therefore, the level of consumption at the second period becomes C2 = max{Y2−D, (1− θ)Y2}. The
sovereign chooses to default if costs of default are smaller than costs of repaying, θY2 < D. Thus, given
D at period 1, the probability of default becomes F (ε∗) where
ε∗ = D/θ − α. (2)
2.1.2 Foreign creditors
There are many atomistic risk neutral foreign investors making transactions with the sovereign. They
face a world risk free interest rate of 1+r, and make zero profits. We focus on the representative investor,
who takes the price q as given and maximizes its expected consumption by choosing how much to demand
credit, D. Therefore, the investor’s problem is
max
D
(
−L+ 11 + rD(1− F (ε
∗))
)
.
From the zero profit condition, the implied price for the sovereign bond becomes:
q = L
D
= 1− F (ε
∗)
1 + r . (3)
2.1.3 Equilibrium
Given F (·), equations (2) and (3) determine demanded repayment amount D, prices q = L/D, and
the probability of default F (ε∗) for each L that the sovereign demands in the first period. As shown in
Calvo (2014), there are multiple equilibria. The foreign investor can offer two schedules of demanded
repayment {Dlow(L), Dhigh(L)} — the first is with a higher bond price and a lower probability of default
and the second is with a lower bond price and a higher probability of default.
Following Calvo (2014), we assume that faced with multiple viable price-debt pairs, the sovereign
chooses the lower level of debt.10 The sovereign takes only the schedule Dlow(L) as given, and chooses the
L that maximizes its expected present value utility. Risk aversion of the sovereign makes the optimal L
to be such that the sovereign smooths its consumption over the two periods, by equating marginal utility
of consumption in the first period with expected marginal utility in the repayment states in the second
period.
9The assumption of proportional endowment loss is key. Having a constant fraction enables us to highlight our main
channels when comparing welfare between free trade and autarky.
10For example, Arellano (2008) and Stangebye (2016) make similar assumptions.
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2.2 An open economy
This section introduces a foreign country to investigate interactions between international trade and
the sovereign bond market. The two countries engage in (costly) trade where they incur an arbitrage
value of iceberg trade costs τ ≥ 1. The state of autarky corresponds to τ = +∞ and τ = 1 means free
trade.
The model consists of two periods where two countries trade goods in both periods. Each of the two
countries is endowed with a single tradable intermediate good. Yt and Y ∗t denote endowments of home
and foreign countries in period t ∈ {1, 2}. There are foreign investors who reside in a third country or the
rest of the world.11 They lend to the home country, which we call the sovereign.
In the first period, endowments in the two countries {Y1, Y ∗1 } are realized. Trade takes place and each
country produces a final consumption good using domestic intermediate goods and imported inputs. As a
result, a final consumption good is a function of these intermediate goods, {c(Y1, Y ∗1 ), c∗(Y1, Y ∗1 )}. Then
the sovereign agrees on a contract of (L,D) with the foreign investors. The bonds are denominated by
the final good of the sovereign. Therefore, final consumptions of the two countries at the end of the first
period are {
C1 = c(Y1, Y ∗1 ) + L
C∗1 = c∗(Y1, Y ∗1 ),
where lower case c’s denote “pre-transfer” consumption, the amount of final goods of the countries as a
result of intermediate good trade; upper case C’s indicate consumptions after the sovereign interacts with
the investors.
Outputs in the second period {Y2, Y ∗2 } are realized in the beginning of the second period. Then
the sovereign decides to default or not. If the sovereign repays, its final consumption would be the pre-
transfer consumption minus the promised amountD. If the sovereign defaults, a fraction θ of the country’s
endowment of intermediate goods are destroyed in exchange of relieved of its obligation to repay its debt.
As a result, if the sovereign repays, the countries’ final consumptions are{
C2 = c(Y2, Y ∗2 )−D
C∗2 = c∗(Y2, Y ∗2 ).
On the other hand, if the sovereign defaults, these are{
C2 = c((1− θ)Y2, Y ∗2 )
C∗2 = c∗((1− θ)Y2, Y ∗2 ).
11This simplifying assumption comes from the fact that, in reality, a country’s debt is owned by investors in many different
countries and a large share of foreign investors comes from countries besides its largest trading partner. For example, in the
United States as of 2018, the largest shares of foreign U.S. treasury bill owners come from China (19%), Japan (17%), and
Brazil (5%), and other 65 different countries as a whole own 43.56% of foreign-owned U.S. treasury bills (U.S. Department of
the Treasury, 2018). In the case of Greece, as of 2015, largest twelve private and official creditors own 267.5 euros of credits
to Greece. The largest share comes from Germany (25%), France (16%), and Italy (14%) according to Singh (2015). Our
model has two countries for the sake of simplicity and assumes that creditors live in a third country that is not explicitly
modeled.
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2.2.1 Pre-transfer consumption
We characterize pre-transfer consumptions of the two countries under two regimes: autarky and free
trade. Representative consumers in the countries have the following preferences:
ct =
1
Φ
[
λ(xHHt )
σ−1
σ + (1− λ)(xFHt )
σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1
c∗t =
1
Φ∗
[
λ∗(xFFt )
σ−1
σ + (1− λ∗)(xHFt )
σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1
where Φ = λ
σ
σ−1 and Φ∗ = (λ∗)
σ
σ−1 are parameters. xijt denotes the amount of intermediate goods shipped
from i to j at time t. σ ∈ (1,∞] is the elasticity of substitution between the two goods, which gives trade
elasticity of 1− σ < 0. Parameters λ ∈ (0, 1) and λ∗ ∈ (0, 1) govern the home bias for home and foreign,
respectively.
Goods market clearing conditions are{
Yt = xHHt + τ∗t xHFt
Y ∗t = τtxFHt + xFFt
where iceberg trade costs for goods that enter home and foreign are denoted as τt and τ∗t , respectively. We
denote ex-factory prices as pt and p∗t , which are endogenously determined taking endowments {Yt, Y ∗t }
and trade costs {τt, τ∗t } as given. Six unknowns {xHHt , xHFt , xFFt , xFHt , pt, p∗t } are pinned down by six
equations: 
xFHt
xHHt
= φ−1
 pt
τtp∗t
σ
xHFt
xFFt
= φ∗−1
 p∗t
τ∗t pt
σ
Yt = xHHt + τ∗t xHFt
Y ∗t = τtxFHt + xFFt
τ∗t ptxHFt = τtp∗txFHt
p∗t = 1
where φ = ( λ1−λ)σ and φ∗ = (
λ∗
1−λ∗ )σ are parameters. The ex-factory price of the foreign country is
normalized as unity. Solving the system of equations gives the amount of consumption in each country
as follows:  ct(Yt, Y
∗
t ) = Yt
[
1 + φ−1τ1−σt pσ−1t
] 1
σ−1
c∗t (Yt, Y ∗t ) = Y ∗t
[
1 + φ∗−1(τ∗t )1−σp1−σt
] 1
σ−1
where terms of trade pt is determined as
pt =
Yt
Y ∗t
=
1
pt
1 + φτσ−1t p1−σt
1 + φ∗(τ∗t )σ−1pσ−1t
. (4)
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Given this general solution with an arbitrage value of trade costs, we compare the level of pre-transfer
consumption in two states of the world: autarky and free trade. In a closed economy equilibrium, τ and
τ∗ are set as infinity. As a result, pre-transfer consumptions would simply be countries’ endowments.{
cAUTt = Yt
c∗AUTt = Y ∗t
(5)
Under free trade where we set τ = τ∗ = 1, pre-transfer consumptions are c
FT
t (Yt, Y ∗t ) = Yt
[
1 + φ−1pσ−1t
] 1
σ−1
c∗FTt (Yt, Y ∗t ) = Y ∗t
[
1 + φ∗−1p1−σt
] 1
σ−1
(6)
where pt is determined by plugging τt = τ∗t into equation (4), which suggests that consumption is the
product of the endowment and the term that captures gains from trade. Also note that the terms of
trade is determined solely by the available endowments of the two countries as shown in equation (4).
The sovereign bond contracts (L,D) are denominated in terms of final consumption goods which do not
affect the terms of trade pt.
2.2.2 Default decisions
Consider the second period where the sovereign has outstanding debt D. Because we only focus on the
second period, time subscripts t are dropped in this section. We assume that a fraction θ of the country’s
endowment is destroyed upon default. Under autarky, the sovereign defaults if the loss of consumption
upon default, or the difference between the pre-transfer consumption with full endowment and one with
partially destroyed endowment is smaller than the outstanding debt D.
Default in autarky if Y −D < (1− θ)Y
⇔ θY < D (7)
Under free trade, the sovereign makes a similar default decision but an additional channel kicks in. It
defaults when the loss of consumption upon default is smaller than outstanding debt D as in the case
under autarky. However, each of the two countries’ pre-transfer consumptions is now described as a
function of their endowments as follows:
Default in free trade if c(Y, Y ∗)−D < c((1− θ)Y, Y ∗)
⇔ c(Y, Y ∗)− c((1− θ)Y, Y ∗) < D. (8)
The left hand sides of equations (7) and (8) express costs of default. If θY is greater than c(Y, Y ∗) −
c((1− θ)Y, Y ∗), then the costs of default are greater under autarky than free trade, and vice versa.
Figure 1 describes pre-transfer consumption schedules under autarky and free trade, where Y ∗ is fixed.
It shows that, depending on the relative size of the endowments in the two countries, costs of default under
autarky can either be greater or smaller than free trade. When the country’s endowment is smaller than
Y¯ where ∂CFT∂Y |Y=Y¯ = 1, an output loss from Y1 to (1− θ)Y1 leads to a consumption loss of ∆CFT1 under
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Figure 1: Pre-transfer consumption schedules
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Notes: The figure shows pre-transfer consumption schedules under autarky and free trade. The autarky consumption schedule
corresponds to a 45 degree line and is denoted by CAUT . The consumption schedule under free trade is described by a concave
curve and is denoted by CFT . Y¯ indicates the level of endowment where the slopes of the consumption schedules dC/dY
are the same under autarky and free trade.
free trade while the same amount of output loss is associated with a smaller loss of consumption under
autarky, ∆CAUT1 . These imply that, when the level of endowment is less than Y¯ , it is more costly to
default under free trade than autarky.
On the other hand, when the country’s endowment is larger than Y¯ , an output loss from Y2 to
(1−θ)Y2 leads to a smaller consumption decline under free trade ∆CFT2 while the same amount of output
loss induces a greater decline in consumption under autarky, ∆CAUT2 . These theoretical considerations
suggest that, when the level of endowment is greater than Y¯ , it is less costly to default under free trade
than autarky.
To understand the mechanism, it is essential to capture the two forces that come into play when
the sovereign opens up to trade. In autarky, the destruction of endowment that occurs upon default
linearly affects consumption, as can be seen from equation (5). However, under free trade, the same loss
of endowment has additional channels through which a loss of endowment affects a sovereign’s incentive
to default.
A derivative of cFT (Y ) with respect to Y clarifies how international trade changes a sovereign’s
10
incentive to default and it is described as follows:
∂
∂Y
cFT (Y ) = g(p) + Y g′(p) ∂p
∂Y
where g(p) =
[
1 + φ−1pσ−1
] 1
σ−1 ,
which shows that the slope of pre-transfer consumption is decomposed in two terms. First, g(p) > 1
captures the part coming from the endowment effect where p is determined by equation (4). Due to a
default, the sovereign will not only lose consumption linearly, but also it loses the positive gains from
trade that were generated from the destroyed endowment.
The second term captures the terms of trade effect. Since g′(p) > 0 and ∂p∂Y < 0, an endowment loss
due to default leads to a more favorable terms of trade for the sovereign. The intuition is as follows.
A decline in output due to default reduces the supply of the good coming from the defaulted country.
This reduction in supply increases the price of that good, leading to a terms-of-trade improvement for
the country. This positive terms of trade effect would push consumption up for all range of Y .
This mechanism through the terms of trade effect is in contrast with other papers, for example, that
of Cuadra and Sapriza (2006). In their model, an exogenously given terms of trade deterioration reduces
a country’s output, reducing its sovereign’s incentive to increase taxes to repay its debt, resulting in a
default. On the other hand, we do not consider changes in terms of trade prior to default. Instead, we
focus on the channel through which a default improves the terms of trade, altering a forward-looking
sovereign’s incentive to default.12
Overall incentive to default is determined by the balance between these two forces. Regarding the
endowment effect described first, the negative effect on consumption is larger when initial endowment Y
is small, which is when gains from trade are greater. Moreover, the terms of trade effect described next
works to allocate a larger fraction of total gains from trade of the two countries to a large country. But
the endowment destruction effect reduces the size of these total gains from trade. Therefore, under free
trade, a sovereign in a small country incurs greater costs of default than that in a large country.
In Appendix A we discuss how Y¯ changes with different parameter values of (σ, λ, λ∗). We find that as
elasticity of substitution increases, Y¯ decreases. This is because a higher elasticity of substitution across
goods diminishes gains from trade, thus the terms of trade effects dominate the negative endowment
effects. Under reasonable values of the parameters, Y¯ becomes a very high value. Therefore, under
realistic parameter values, costs of default are higher under free trade than aurarky in most countries.
3 Empirical analysis
The model presented in the previous section shows that international trade and an access to a sovereign
bond market jointly benefit a country by raising its welfare. The model also yields several testable
hypotheses. This section verifies the model’s theoretical predictions using data and provides an empirical
evidence that the model’s underlying mechanisms leading to gains from trade are present.
12One may argue that, in reality, a default leads to a terms-of-trade deterioration due to a depreciation of the nominal
exchange rate. However, this paper focuses on real effects rather than nominal effects. Even though a depreciation of the
nominal exchange rate works to worsen the terms of trade, our argument still holds true if more open countries have a greater
incentive to maintain the value of their currencies to avoid a terms-of-trade deterioration than less open countries.
11
3.1 Cross-sectional regressions
We first examine the relationship between a country’s openness and its likelihood to default. The model
suggests that more open countries have a smaller incentive to choose default than less open countries.
We directly test this prediction by investigating the association between countries’ openness measured by
exports plus imports divided by GDP and the number of defaults.
Default episodes come from various sources. Following Furceri and Zdzienicka (2012), we take the data
on default episodes from five different sources (De Paoli et al., 2006; Detragiache and Spilimbergo, 2001;
Laeven and Valencia, 2008; Levy-Yeyati and Panizza, 2011; Reinhart et al., 2003). In order to follow up
more recent studies on sovereign defaults, we also collect default episodes from Asonuma and Trebesch
(2016), Trebesch and Zabel (2017), and Kuvshinov and Zimmermann (2017). These data sources cover
defaults on their debt to private creditors.13 Overlapping episodes across data sources are counted as one
episode.
Figure 2 shows the average number of defaultsduring the period 1970-2008 for three groups of countries,
(1) most open countries — their openness measures are greater than 75th percentile of the distribution in
1970, (2) moderately open countries — openness is between 50th and 75th percentiles, and (3) least open
countries — less than 50th percentile.14 Panel A shows that the least open countries had, on average,
3.6 defaults. On the other hand, the moderately open countries had about two default episodes. The
most open countries had less than one default on average. Panel B shows the average level of openness,
(Imports+ Exports)/GDP , to give a sense of how openness varies across the three groups of countries.
The most open countries have nearly 100 percent openness on average while it is 38 percent and 13 percent
in moderately open and least open countries, respectively.
The default episodes described in Figure 3 are broken into eight bars based on original data sources
in order to show that the result does not come from a particular combination of different data sources.
It shows that the order of the average number of defaults across the three groups of countries, most open
countries < moderately open countries < least open countries, holds true in all different data sources
except the ones obtained from Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2001).15 The observed relationship between
the degree of openness and the number of default episodes is consistent with the model’s theoretical
predictions.
We statistically test this relationship between openness and the number of defaults. The dependent
variable is the number of defaults, which takes zeros for many countries in the sample and discrete values
for the rest of the sample. Therefore, we assume that the number of defaults of country c, yc, follows a
Poisson distribution:
Pr(y1, ..., yN |X1, ...,XN ;θ) =
N∏
c=1
exp(ycθ ′Xc) exp(−eθ′Xc)
yc!
,
where N denotes the number of countries in the sample; Xc indicates a vector of explanatory variables
13See Appendix D.1 for an analysis regarding Paris Club official debt restructurings. See Appendix E for a list of default
episodes in each of these data sources.
14See Appendix C for a list of these groups of countries.
15Although the order does not hold true for three groups of countries, the largest average number of defaults come from
the moderately open countries. The least open countries have the second largest average number of defaults. Therefore, we
can still argue that a greater openness is associated with a smaller number of defaults.
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Figure 2: Average number of defaults by the degree of openness
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Notes: Panel A shows the average number of defaults for countries in each group. The default episodes come from various
sources and overlapping episodes across sources are counted as one episode. Panel B describes the average openness. The most
open countries are defined as countries where their openness measures are greater than the 75th percentile of distribution in
1970. The moderately open countries are those between the 50th percentile and the 75th percentile. The least open countries
are those less than the 50th percentile. See Appendix C for a list of these groups of countries.
for country c, including openness, natural log of GDP per capita, natural log of GDP, the debt-to-GDP
ratio, and the political stability index; θ is a vector of parameters to be estimated. The conditional
probability of observing numbers of defaults for a number N of countries, y1, ..., yN , given explanatory
variables X1, ...,XN and parameters θ, Pr(y1, ..., yN |X1, ...,XN ;θ), is fitted by the Poisson distribution
function in the right-hand side.
The dependent variable is the cumulative number of defaults during the period 1970-2008. We use
explanatory variables from the initial period of the sample, 1970, because these variables may change
endogenously due to defaults. The debt-to-GDP ratio and the political stability index are not available in
1970 and their earliest observations come from 1980 and 1984, respectively. Therefore, observations from
these years are used for these two variables. This Poisson regression model estimates the relationship
between the initial level of openness in 1970 and the number of defaults in subsequent years, controlling
for other economic and political conditions. We argue that the initial level of openness and other economic
and political conditions are exogenous.
The level of openness is measured as a share of GDP, Openc = (Importsc + Exportsc)/GDPc, for
each country c. Our theoretical model assumes balanced trade and does not yield different predictions
regarding the impact of imports and exports. Therefore, imports and exports are symmetrically treated
in this empirical analysis.
Table 1 reports the results. Because coefficients from the Poisson model do not have quantitative
13
Figure 3: Average number of defaults by the degree of openness and by data source
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Notes: The most open countries are defined as countries where their openness measures are greater than the 75th percentile
of distribution in 1970. The moderately open countries are those between the 50th percentile and the 75th percentile. The
least open countries are those less than the 50th percentile. See Appendix C for a list of these groups of countries.
meaning, in the bottom of the table we report marginal effects of a 100 percentage points increase in
openness on the number of defaults. Column (1) regresses the number of defaults on openness only. It
shows that, as expected, openness has a negative coefficient and significantly significant at the 1 percent
level. Marginal effects are economically sizable. A 100 percentage points increase in openness reduces the
number of defaults by 2.5.
Column (2) controls for countries’ income levels because low-income countries are more likely to have
defaults and the level of income seems an important determinant of the propensity to have defaults.
Adding log of GDP per capita reduces the marginal effects of openness but it is still statistically less
than zero. Column (3) introduces log of GDP, controlling for market size. Column (4) further adds the
debt-to-GDP ratio because the model suggests that a more open country has less incentive to choose to
default for the same level of debt. The last column includes the political stability index in order to control
for political conditions. Either of these shows that openness has significantly negative effects — a 100
percentage point rise in openness reduces the number of defaults by 1.6 to 3.5, depending upon the set of
control variables. Again, these results are consistent with the model’s theoretical prediction.
3.2 Panel regressions
The regressions in the previous sub-section use cross-sectional variations in the data only to examine
the link between initial levels of openness and subsequent number of defaults. This section runs panel
regressions to estimate the impact of a change in a country’s openness on the likelihood of defaults bonds’
interest rates in the same country. Employing a panel dataset makes it possible to examine how openness
effects vary depending on the size of countries because we have a large enough number of observations.
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Table 1: Openness and the number of defaults, Poisson
Dependent variable = the number of defaults during 1970-2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Openness -1.647*** -0.651* -0.925** -0.992** -1.320***
(0.325) (0.349) (0.402) (0.409) (0.452)
ln(GDP per capita) -0.281*** -0.193** 0.037 0.069
(0.064) (0.087) (0.090) (0.101)
ln(GDP) -0.079 0.025 -0.107*
(0.051) (0.054) (0.063)
Debt-to-GDP ratio 0.009*** 0.005**
(0.002) (0.002)
Political stability index -0.009
(0.112)
Constant 0.914*** 2.847*** 4.107*** -0.049 3.156**
(0.107) (0.427) (0.912) (1.160) (1.387)
Observations 124 87 87 67 56
Pseudo R-sq. 0.071 0.111 0.118 0.103 0.098
Log-likelihood ratio 35.13 40.48 42.92 29.37 23.37
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Marginal effects of a 100 percentage points increase in openness
Openness -2.5*** -1.2* -1.6** -2.3** -3.5***
(0.5) (0.6) (0.7) (1.0) (1.2)
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Standard errors are in
parentheses. The dependent variable is the number of defaults during 1970-2008, which takes zeros for a large fraction of
the sample and takes a discrete value for the rest of the sample. Therefore, we employ a Poisson model. The explanatory
variables come from 1970 except for the debt-to-GDP ratio and the political stability index where these variables from 1970
are not available. The debt-to-GDP ratio comes from 1980 and the political stability index comes from 1984. The marginal
effects of a 100 percentage points increase in openness on the number of defaults are reported in the bottom of the table.
Delta-method standard errors are in parentheses.
First, the openness effects on the bond’s interest rates are tested by estimating the following equations:
ic,t = αc + α1Openc,t + Xc,tα2 + uc,t, (9)
ic,t = βc + β1Openc,t + βMedium(Openc,t ×DMediumc ) + βLarge(Openct ×DLargec ) (10)
+Xc,tβ2 +DMediumc θt +DLargec θt + ec,t,
where ic,t denotes the government bond interest rate for private creditors in country c in year t16; Xc,t is a
vector of control variables including the interest payments-to-GDP ratio, GDP growth rates, natural log
of GDP per capita, the debt-to-GDP ratio, the inflation rates, and the default dummy where we closely
follow the literature in choosing these control variables (Bellas et al., 2010; Cimadomo et al., 2016); αc
and βc indicate country fixed effects; and uc,t and ec,t are error terms. Each of α1, α2, β1, and β2 denotes
a scalar (or a vector) of parameters to be estimated.
DLargec and DMediumc are constructed based on country size measured by GDP in 1995. Large countries
16We also estimate the same regression by replacing the dependent variable with the bonds’ interest rates for official
creditors. See Appendix D.1 for results.
15
are defined as those where their GDPs are greater than the 75th percentile of the distribution in 1995
and medium-sized countries are those between the 25th and the 75th percentiles. Small countries are the
rest. Country groups do not change over time.17 Because an interaction term with the large country
dummy is introduced, the parameter β1 measures the effect of openness on the bond interest rates in
small countries. Linear combinations of coefficients, (β1 + βMedium) and (β1 + βLarge), capture the effect
of openness on the bond interest rates in medium-sized countries and large countries, respectively. The
model suggests β1 < (β1 + βMedium) < (β1 + βLarge) < 0.
Second, we estimate the relationship between openness on the likelihood of default. The regression
equation is
Pr(Default)c,t = Λ(γ1Openc,t−1 + Xc,t−1γ2 + u˜c,t), (11)
where Pr(Default)c,t is the probability of default in country c in year t and we have openness and other
control variables in the right-hand side. γ1 and γ2 are parameters to be estimated. u˜c,t indicates an error
term. Λ(.) denotes a logistic distribution used to fit the probability of default. Due to the fact that there
are many countries experienced no default and there is no time-series variation in the dependent variable
for those countries, introducing country fixed effects drops those countries. As a result, we lose a large
number of observations. In order to cover as many countries as possible, we do not introduce country
fixed effects. Furthermore, in order to partially address endogeneity between default and openness, the
right-hand side variables are lagged variables.18 We fully address this potential endogeneity issue by
employing a 2SLS in Appendix D.2.
This logit model is not linear. Therefore, we are unable to introduce interaction terms between open-
ness and country size dummies since such interaction terms would not capture different slope parameters
contrary to a linear model. In order to allow different openness effects across groups of countries, we
simply estimate equation (11) for each of the three groups of countries — small countries, medium-sized
countries, and large countries.
We obtain data from various sources. The interest rates on external debt are obtained from the
International Financial Statistics (IMF, 2018b). The data on interest payments come from the Global
Financial Development Database (World Bank, 2018a). The data on GDP and the inflation rate are
retrieved from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2018b). The data on openness are based
on exports-to-GDP ratios and imports-to-GDP ratios from the Penn World Table 9.0 (Feenstra et al.,
2015).
Table 2 presents the results from estimating equations (9) and (10). The dependent variable is ex-
pressed in percentage (e.g., 1.2 means that the interest rate is 1.2 percent). The openness variable
represents (Importsc+Exportsc)/GDPc. As a result, the estimated coefficients represent the impact of a
100 percentage points increase in openness on the bonds’ interest rates, expressed in percentage. Column
(1) regresses the bonds’ interest rates on openness only. It shows that a 100 percentage points increase
17See Appendix C for list of countries in the country groups. We choose the year 1995 to define the country groups because
it is in the middle of the sample period. Our results do not depend upon this choice.
18A number of studies find that a sovereign default reduces trade. See, for example, Rose (2005), Martinez and Sandleris
(2011), Zymek (2012), Gopinath and Neiman (2014), and Asonuma et al. (2016). Equations (9) and (10) examine the
contemporaneous relationship between openness and the interest rate because we argue there is virtually no reverse causality
from the bond interest rate to openness.
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Table 2: Openness effects on the bonds’ interest rates
Dependent variable = the bonds’ interest rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Openness -2.421*** -3.288** -8.407*** -7.785*** -5.407***
(0.330) (1.600) (2.139) (2.285) (1.828)
DMedium× Openness 1.442 3.659 4.021 0.976
(2.450) (2.766) (2.889) (3.891)
DLarge× Openness 4.231** 9.229* 7.179 3.373
(1.946) (5.376) (4.653) (6.756)
DMedium × ft and DLarge × ft X X X X
R-squared 0.007 0.110 0.194 0.203 0.251
Observations 2,943 2,943 1,718 1,626 1,027
Countries 70 70 57 57 55
Controls
Interest payments-to-GDP ratio X X X
GDP growth rate X X
ln(GDP per capita) X X
Debt-to-GDP ratio X
Inflation rate X
Default dummy X
Linear combination of coefficients
Medium-sized countries -1.847 -4.748*** -3.763** -4.432
(1.855) (1.748) (1.818) (3.496)
Large countries 0.943 0.822 -0.606 -2.034
(1.107) (4.924) (4.099) (6.607)
Notes: The dependent variable is the bonds’ interest rates. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively. Standard errors, clustered at the country-level, are in parentheses. All regressions include a constant
term and country fixed effects. Columns (2)-(5) introduce interaction terms year fixed effects ft and DMedium (or DLarge)
in order to identify the openness effects in medium-sized countries (or large countries). See Appendix C for a list of these
groups of countries.
openness reduce the bonds’ interest rates by 2.4 percent and it is significant at the 1 percent level.
Column (2) introduces interaction terms between openness and DMedium and DLarge, respectively,
in order to allow different openness effects across countries depending upon their country size. It shows
that a greater openness reduces the interest rates only in small countries — the estimated coefficient is
-3.3. The openness effects in medium-sized and large countries are -1.8 and 0.9, respectively, but these
are statistically insignificant. These results are consistent with the model’s theoretical prediction that
the openness has greater effects in smaller countries than larger countries. Column (3) introduces the
interest payments-to-GDP ratio. Column (4) further adds the GDP growth rate and natural log of GDP
per capita. Moreover, the debt-to-GDP ratio, the inflation rate, and the default dummy are added in
column (5) as controls. Introducing these controls does not change our result that the openness effects
are greater in small countries than larger countries.
Table 3 presents results from estimating equation (11) for each group of countries — the first, second
and third rows report the openness effects for small countries, medium-sized countries, and large countries,
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Table 3: Openness effects on the probability of default, Logit
Dependent variable = the default dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Openness, small countries -0.068*** -0.136*** -0.128*** -0.130*** -0.407**
(0.022) (0.044) (0.044) (0.050) (0.197)
Observations 1,446 959 944 944 295
Countries 35 29 29 29 14
Openness, medium-sized countries -0.098*** -0.090*** -0.081*** -0.088*** -0.164*
(0.018) (0.028) (0.028) (0.031) (0.091)
Observations 2,787 1,621 1,592 1,575 548
Countries 69 59 59 58 27
Openness, large countries -0.077*** -0.061 -0.066 -0.199** -0.119
(0.022) (0.057) (0.056) (0.095) (0.135)
Observations 1,674 535 526 451 184
Countries 40 26 26 26 14
Controls
Interest payments-to-GDP ratio X X X X
GDP growth rate X X X
ln(GDP per capita) X X
Debt-to-GDP ratio X
Inflation rate X
Arrears-to-GNI ratio X
Notes: The table reports marginal effects of a 100 percentage point increase in openness. Delta-method standard errors are
in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. See Appendix C
for a list of these groups of countries.
respectively. The table shows marginal effects of a 100 percentage points increase in openness and delta-
method standard errors are in parentheses. Column (1) regresses the default dummy on openness without
introducing any controls. The result shows that a greater level of openness reduces the probability of
default in all groups of countries. A 100 percentage points increase in openness reduces the default
probability by 6.8 percent, 9.8 percent, and 7.7 percent in small, medium-sized, and large countries,
respectively.
Following columns incrementally introduce additional control variables — column (2) includes the
interest payments-to-GDP ratio; column (3) adds the GDP growth rate; column (4) further incorporates
GDP per capita, and the inflation rate and the arrears-to-GNI ratio are included in column (5). By
controlling for these variables, the openness effect becomes greater, especially in small countries. For ex-
ample, column (5) shows that a 100 percentage points increase in openness reduces the default probability
by 40.7 percent, 16.4 percent, and 11.9 percent in small, medium-sized, and large countries, respectively.
Statistical significance only comes from small countries.
Overall, the empirical results confirm the model’s theoretical prediction that a greater level of openness
is associated with a lower frequency of defaults and a lower interest rate charged by foreign creditors.
The magnitude of these openness effects is also shown to be different depending on the size of countries
measured by GDP. As is consistent with the theory, the effects of openness are greater for smaller countries
than larger countries.
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4 Numerical analysis
This section calibrates the model to quantify gains from trade when a country has access to a sovereign
bond market. In so doing, the two-period model presented in Section 2 is extended to a general infinite
horizon model. The infinite horizon model is used to calibrate the model’s parameters and then a numerical
simulation is performed to quantify gains from trade.
4.1 Infinite horizon model
4.1.1 Sovereign government’s problem
Key features in the two period model remain the same in this section. The two countries receive
stream of intermediate goods endowments {Yt, Y ∗t } that they trade with each other. Also, the sovereign
has access to contracts (Lt, Dt+1) with the foreign investors who reside in a third country. The contracts
are one period state non-contingent bonds that give Lt unit of consumption goods to home’s representative
household at period t, with the promise of paying back Dt+1 units in period t+1. The price of the contract
is thus qt+1 = Lt/Dt+1.
Home’s expected utility in the initial period is
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
C1−t
1−  .
The pre-transfer consumption of the two countries in each period are the same as in the previous section. In
each period, given the endowments {Yt, Y ∗t }, the two countries obtain pre-transfer consumption schedules
denoted in equations (6) and (4). In each period, the state of the economy is described by outstanding
government debt and the two countries’ endowment {Dt, Yt, Y ∗t }. Given these, the sovereign has the
option to default or to repay its debt in each period. Thus the sovereign’s value at period t is:
V (Dt, Yt, Y ∗t ) = max
(
V R(Dt, Yt, Y ∗t ), V D(Yt, Y ∗t )
)
,
where V R(Dt, Yt, Y ∗t ) is the value of the sovereign if it repays the debt, which is described as:
V R(Dt, Yt, Y ∗t ) = max
Dt+1
(
C1−t
1−  + βEt[V (Dt+1, Yt+1, Y
∗
t+1)]
)
s.t. Ct = ct(Yt, Y ∗t ) + qt+1Dt+1 −Dt,
and V D(Yt, Y ∗t ) is the value of the sovereign if it decides to default. In that case, a fraction θ of Yt
is destroyed and the sovereign is excluded from the foreign bond market. From the next period, the
sovereign repays its debt with probability pi with zero outstanding debt. As a result, the value function
becomes:
V D(Yt, Y ∗t ) =
C1−t
1−  + β
{
piEt[V (0, Yt+1, Y ∗t+1)] + (1− pi)Et[V D(Yt+1, Y ∗t+1)]
}
,
s.t. Ct = ct((1− θ)Yt, Y ∗t ).
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Note that in this infinite horizon model, the sovereign incurs not only direct output costs upon default
but also costs from being excluded from the international capital market. Thus, in each period, the
sovereign makes a default decision by considering the balance between the present value costs of paying
its debt and the present value costs of an output loss and costs from not being able to smooth consumption.
4.1.2 Foreign investors’ problem
Foreign investors reside outside the two economies, and they are small and large in numbers. Taking
the bond price qt+1 as given, the investors maximize their profits:
max
Dt+1
(
−qt+1Dt+1 + 11 + rDt+11{Repay}
)
,
which is zero in equilibrium. 1{Repay} is an indicator function takes 1 if the sovereign repays its debt
and zero otherwise. The implied price for the sovereign bond is
qt+1 =
Lt
Dt+1
= Prob(Repay)1 + r .
4.1.3 Recursive equilibrium
We assume that the endowment processes of the two countries follow a log-normal AR(1) process.
Shocks to the two streams are uncorrelated. The processes are described as follows:{
log(Yt) = log(Y¯t) + ρ(log(Yt−1)− log(Y¯t)) + εt
log(Y ∗t ) = log(Y¯ ∗t ) + ρ∗(log(Y ∗t−1)− log(Y¯ ∗t )) + ε∗t
(12)
where (
εt
ε∗t
)
∼ N
((
0
0
)
,Σ
)
, Σ =
(
σ2 0
0 (σ∗)2
)
and (Y¯t, Y¯ ∗t ) are mean incomes of the two economies.
Summing all up, exogenous parameters of the model are {β, r, , λ, λ∗, σ, θ, pi ρ, ρ∗, σ, σ∗} and the state
of the economy is described by three variables {Dt, Yt, Y ∗t }. The recursive equilibrium of this economy is a
set of policy functions for (a) home and foreign’s pre-transfer consumption; (b) sovereign’s default decision
and bond issuance; and (c) bond price functions, such that (i) Taking the price of bonds and the relative
price of goods as given, both the sovereign and foreign pre-transfer consumption satisfy their optimization
problem; (i’) When faced with multiple viable debt-price schedules, the sovereign chooses the one with
lower debt; (ii) The good market clears; (iii) Taking the bond price as given, the sovereign’s default
decision satisfies its dynamic problem; (iv) The bond price reflects the sovereign’s default probability and
is consistent with the investors’ maximization problem.
4.2 Calibration and simulation
We consider a two-country world where there are Argentina and China because these countries provide
an excellent example of the model’s theoretical set up — one country, Argentina, benefits from access
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to a sovereign bond market while it opens up with another country, China.19 Figure 4 shows bilateral
trade flows between Argentina and China (as shares of Argentina’s GDP) from 1993 to 2013. It shows
that Argentina’s exports to China and its imports from China increased drastically after 2001, China’s
accession to the World Trade Organization. We employ Argentina’s opening up to trade with China as
an ideal case to study its gains from trade.
In this experiment, we compare the two states of the world as in the previous sections. The first is
analogous to the autarky economy in previous theoretical analyses. We estimate the endowment shock
process from the real GDP sequence of Argentina from 1993 to 2013, and compute the recursive equilibrium
defined in the previous section, but with infinite trade costs. The second is analogous to the free trade
economy with two countries. We also estimate the Chinese endowment process using the Chinese real
GDP data from 2002 to 2013, and consider China as Argentina’s trading partner in the model. Then we
compute the recursive equilibrium where the two countries have trade with zero trade costs.
Figure 4: Argentina’s exports to China and its imports from China as shares of Argentina’s
GDP, 1993-2013
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Notes: The figure shows bilateral trade flows between Argentina and China as shares of Argentina’s GDP. The data on
bilateral trade flows come from the Direction of Trade Statistics (IMF, 2018a) and the data on GDP are obtained from the
WDI (World Bank, 2018b).
In the numerical analysis, we modify the endowment costs that the sovereign has to incur upon default.
Instead of assuming that an uniform fraction of endowment is destroyed upon default, we assume that
19Previous articles conducting calibration analyses by employing Argentina’s case to study sovereign debt include Arellano
(2008), Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), Yue (2010), Asonuma (2014), and Asonuma (2016).
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the level of endowment upon default is determined as follows:
Y defaultt =
{
γE(Yt) if Yt > γE(Yt)
Yt if else
which implies that the fraction of destroyed endowment is weakly increasing in the endowment size. This
construction is the same as Arellano (2008). When a realized output level is low, the sovereign does
not suffer any output destruction and is only deprived of its ability to smooth consumption. But when
a realized level of endowment is greater than a certain threshold, the sovereign starts to suffer from an
increasing fraction of direct output loss upon default.
We need this assumption that default costs are larger in “good times” than in “bad times” in order to
match empirical observations that a country is more likely to default when it is facing with a lower level
endowment or a lower GDP growth rate (e.g., Kuvshinov and Zimmermann, 2017). This assumption is
also consistent with models with endogenous production. Mendoza and Yue (2012) assume that domestic
firms lose access to world credit markets upon sovereign default, thus cannot finance working capital to
import a certain fraction of intermediate goods. Under this setup, they find that a GDP loss upon default
is increasing in the size of a negative TFP shock.
4.2.1 Data and parameters
Argentinian and Chinese quarterly GDP data are taken from the National Institute of Statistics and
Censuses (INDEC) and the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS), respectively.20 We estimate pa-
rameters governing the endowment processes in equation (12) using a maximum log-likelihood method.21
Estimated parameters are ρ = 0.91, ρ∗ = 0.81, σ = 0.015, and σ∗ = 0.016, where Argentina is the Home
country and China is the Foreign country. Given the estimated endowment processes, we then discretize
the process into a finite state Markov chain using the procedures described in Hussey and Tauchen (1991).
Table 4 summarizes parameter specifications. The discount rate β = 0.86 follows Asonuma (2014),
which is set to match Argentina’s average default frequency documented in Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer
(2007). Risk free rate r is set to be 0.017 as in Arellano (2008). The coefficient of risk aversion is assumed
to be 2 following the literature.22 The endowment threshold γ also follows Arellano (2008) and set to be
0.969. The probability of reentry pi is set as 0.282 which is consistent with empirical findings in Gelos
et al. (2011).
4.2.2 Results
Figure 5 shows bond price schedules under autarky and free trade. The price schedules show that the
sovereign faces higher prices for the same amount of debt under free trade, reflecting a lower probability
of default. Though the basic structure of the model remains the same as the two period model, the size of
20The data on Argentinian GDP are converted to constant 2005 USD prices using inflation and exchange rates from US
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and Central Bank of Argentina. The data on Chinese GDP are converted to constant
2005 USD prices using inflation and exchange rates from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2018b), and the
People’s Bank of China. It is also seasonally adjusted by X-12-ARIMA Seasonal Adjustment Program by the US Census
Bureau.
21We detrend the data with Hodrick-Prescott filter using smoothing parameter of 1600.
22Asonuma (2014), Asonuma (2016), and Kollmann (1996) also set their risk aversion coefficients to the same number.
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Table 4: Specifications of parameters
Parameter Value Source
Discount rate β = 0.86 Asonuma (2014)
Risk free rate r = 0.017 Arellano (2008)
Risk aversion  = 2 RBC literature
Weights of xHH and xFF λ = 0.5, λ∗ = 0.5 Asonuma (2014)
Elasticity of substitution σ = 5 Simonovska and Waugh (2014)
Endowment threshold γ = 0.969 Arellano (2008)
Probability of reentry pi = 0.282 Gelos et al. (2011)
AR(1) persistence ρ = 0.91, ρ∗ = 0.81 Estimated
AR(1) standard deviation σ = 0.016, σ∗ = 0.015 Estimated
the changes in prices due to trade seems smaller in this infinite horizon model. This comes from the fact
that we make a slightly different assumption on an output loss due to default. Previously we assumed
an uniform two percent reduction in endowment. In this section, however, output declines only when the
level of endowment is higher than 97 percent of its mean value. Thus, for endowments in the lower half
of the distribution, default costs are zero. This reduces the difference of default costs between free trade
and autarky, resulting in smaller bond price differences.
Figure 5: Pricing schedules under autarly and free trade
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Notes: The figure shows pricing schedule under autarky and free trade. See Table 4 for parameter values.
There are two sources that a sovereign gains from trade. One is traditional gains from trade coming
from “love of variety" features in the CES utility function. The other comes from a country’s ability to
smooth out consumption by issuing bonds. This second channel of consumption smoothing is affected by
two forces creating incompleteness of the bond market.
The first is the fact that sovereign bonds are state non-contingent. By issuing state non-contingent
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bonds, the sovereign tries to smooth consumption paths as in Mendoza (1991). But since the sovereign’s
discount rate β is smaller than the world discount rate 1/(1 + r), an impatient sovereign will always
borrow. Moreover, endogenous bond prices make it easier to borrow when the level of endowment is
greater. This is because the probability of default is lower in such situation. As a result, the sovereign
borrows more in a good time than in a bad time.
Second, bonds are defaultable. By defaulting when endowments are low and there is large outstanding
debt, the sovereign mitigates the negative effects on consumption due to a low endowment shock. Since it
is harder for the sovereign to borrow when the endowment is low, it defaults even with smaller outstanding
debt in low endowment periods. Therefore this defaulting channel works as a consumption smoothing
mechanism, which is similar to the notion explained in Zame (1993).
Table 5: Simulation result (in quarterly frequency)
Autarky Free trade
Average interest rate spread, 1/q − 1 (%) 3.25 2.66
Pre-default interest rate spread (%) 3.48 2.85
Average default probability (%) 3.10 2.55
Average debt-to-output ratio (%) 4.81 3.96
Notes: The table summarizes simulation results on various variables under the benchmark parameter assumption σ = 5. See
Table 4 for other parameter values.
Given these equilibrium features, we present simulation results. To examine the effect of moving from
autraky to free trade on bond prices and on welfare, we simulate the model for 1000 times, given the
obtained policy functions. Each trial of the simulations is run for 2000 periods, and the last 200 periods
are taken to analyze the steady state distribution. In analyzing bond prices, we exclude the periods
when the sovereign is in default because bond prices are not well defined in those periods. Following the
literature, we consider the 74 periods prior to default events when we analyze pre-default statistics.
Table 5 reports simulation results along with other statistics. The first column, which reports statistics
where trade is not allowed, is comparable to those from Arellano (2008). By having trade with another
country, the sovereign’s default probability decreases, which in turn increases its sovereign bond price.
It shows that the average debt-to-output ratio is smaller under free trade. The sovereign’s capacity to
accumulate debt expands when it moves from autarky to free trade. However, output also increases due
to trade. As a result, the debt-to-output ratio declines.
Facing more favorable bond prices, the sovereign benefits from not only traditional gains from trade
but also an additional intertemporal gains from trade. Table 6 reports additional percentage increase
in present value welfare at steady state, 100 × (WFT −WAUT )/WAUT where WFT and WAUT denote
the present value welfare under free trade and autarky, respectively, with and without a sovereign bond
market.
An increase in welfare without bond issuance is calculated using the corresponding endowment se-
quences that are used in the simulation. The welfare gains from trade are around 16 percent in the
baseline case where we assume σ = 5, and it is consistent with the present value of the static gains from
trade. On the other hand, the gains from opening up to trade when the sovereign is issuing bonds become
19 percent. The difference between these two gains — around three percentage points — comes from
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Table 6: Gains from trade
Benchmark Robustness checks
σ = 5 σ = 3 σ = 7
100× (WFT −WAUT )/WAUT , without bond issuance 16.3 29.3 10.9
100× (WFT −WAUT )/WAUT , with bond issuance 19.4 41.5 12.3
Additional gains from trade
Percentage point difference (% points) 3.1 12.2 1.4
With bond issuance/without bond issuance 1.19 1.42 1.13
Notes: The table summarizes the home country’s additional increase in welfare due to free trade relative to the welfare
level under autarky, 100× (WFT −WAUT )/WAUT where WFT and WAUT denote the level of welfare under free trade and
autarky, respectively. Gains from trade are computed for three different values of elasticity of substitution σ. See Table 4
for other parameter values.
the fact that the sovereign has more capacity to borrow, and faces higher bond price. Therefore, the
sovereign enjoys additional gains from trade from the sovereign bond market, which is around one fifth
of the traditional gains from trade.
Results from the robustness checks show that gains from trade change by assuming different values
of elasticity of substitution: σ = 3 and σ = 7. As expected, a higher substitutability reduces gains from
trade. But it also diminishes additional gains from an access to a sovereign bond market. Recall Figure 1
in Section 2.2.2. In the static version of the model, a higher substitutability reduces the region of the home
country’s endowment where default cost is higher under free trade than in autarky. In other words, a
higher σ decreases Y¯ . This means that for Y that is less than Y¯ , the slope of the consumption schedule in
free trade diminishes and becomes closer to that of the consumption schedule in autarky. Costs of default
are still higher than under autarky, but the costs diminish as the elasticity of substitution increases. The
difference in gains from trade between free trade and autarky becomes smaller, which works to reduce
additional gains by opening up to trade. Nevertheless, we find that the additional gains that come from
the sovereign bond market are substantial in magnitude.
Though the source of the additional gains from trade is different, we find that our estimates on
additional gains from trade are in the same ballpark as those from other papers. Melitz and Redding
(2015) perform a numerical exercise to quantify the gains from trade. They compare the gains from trade
based on the welfare formula in Arkolakis et al. (2012) (hereafter the ACR formula) and the one based
on their model with a truncated Pareto distribution. In their experiment of reducing the of iceberg trade
costs from 3 to 1.25, the gains from trade are around three percentage points larger. Ramanarayanan
(2018) finds that introducing linkages from imported inputs increases the gains from trade by around 7
percentage points. Ossa (2015) quantifies Argentina’s gains from trade by using his multi-sector model
of trade. He compares changes in real income moving from autarky to the year 2007 level of trade. He
shows that the gains from trade are around 20 percentage points larger than those implied from the ACR
formula.
Note that the results do not exactly reveal Argentina’s actual gains from trade with China. Obviously,
the results are limited given the stylized setup of the model. Nevertheless, they are informative in grasping
the magnitude of how much a sovereign gains through the bond market by opening up to trade.
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5 Conclusion
We have investigated how interactions between international trade and access to the sovereign bond
market shape a country’s gains from trade by using an Armington (1969)’s model of trade with a sovereign
bond market a la Arellano (2008). As is conventional in the literature, the model assumes that a default
reduces a country’s output, which in turn reduces the country’s imports and exports. As a result, a
greater openness of a country makes a default more costly because the country loses a greater amount of
consumption due to a default. Therefore, a greater openness reduces a likelihood of default, reducing the
interest rate charged by foreign creditors.
These mechanisms are confirmed by a cross-sectional regression as well as a panel regression. Indeed,
more open countries have a fewer defaults than less open countries and an increase in a country’s openness
reduces the country’s bond interest rate. The regression results also imply that the effect of openness
on the probability of default and the bonds’ interest rate depends on its country size measured by GDP,
which is consistent with the model’s theoretical predictions.
These empirical results confirm that the model’s underlying mechanisms leading to gains from trade
are present. By opening up to trade, the country reduces the probability of default because it becomes
more costly to default, leading to a lower interest rate and a higher price of its sovereign bond. This results
in a greater level of consumption, therefore a higher level of welfare. As a result, an access to sovereign
bond market works to magnify gains from trade. Our numerical exercise shows that gains from trade
become about three parentage points greater by introducing a sovereign bond market. This suggests one
reason why conventional trade models, which do not have a sovereign bond market, lead to surprisingly
small gains from trade as shown by Arkolakis et al. (2012).
26
References
Aguiar, Mark and Gita Gopinath (2006). “Defaultable Debt, Interest Rates and the Current Account”.
In: Journal of International Economics 69.1, pp. 64–83.
Antrás, Pol and Ricardo J. Caballero (2009). “Trade and Capital Flows: A Financial Frictions Perspec-
tive”. In: Journal of Political Economy 117.4, pp. 701–744.
Arellano, Cristina (2008). “Default Risk and Income Fluctuations in Emerging Economies”. In: American
Economic Review 93.3, pp. 690–712.
Arkolakis, Costas, Arnaud Costinot, and Andres Rodriguez-Clare (2012). “New Trade Models, Same Old
Gains?” In: American Economic Review 102.1, pp. 94–130.
Armington, Paul S. (1969). “A Theory of Demand for Products Distinguished by Place of Production”.
In: IMF Staff Papers 16.1, pp. 159–178.
Asonuma, Tamon (2014). “Sovereign Defaults, External Debt and Real Exchange Rate Dynamics”. IMF
Working Paper WP/16/37.
— (2016). “Serial Sovereign Defaults and Debt Restructurings”. IMF Working Paper WP/16/65.
Asonuma, Tamon, Marcos Chamon, Aitor Erce, and Akira Sasahara (2018). “Costs of Sovereign De-
faults: Restructuring Strategies, Bank Distress and the Capital Inflow-Credit Channel”. Unpublished
manuscript.
Asonuma, Tamon, Marcos Chamon, and Akira Sasahara (2016). “Trade Costs of Sovereign Debt Restruc-
turings: Does a Market-Friendly Approach Improve the Outcome?” IMF Working Paper WP/16/222.
Asonuma, Tamon and Christoph Trebesch (2016). “Sovereign Debt Restructurings: Preemptive or Post-
default”. In: Journal of the European Economic Association 14.1, pp. 175–214.
Beck, Thorsten (2003). “Financial Dependence and International Trade”. In: Review of International
Economics 11.2, pp. 296–316.
Bellas, Dimitri, Michael G. Papaioannou, and Iva Petrova (2010). “Determinants of Emerging Market
Sovereign Bond Spreads: Fundamentals vs Financial Stress”. IMF working Paper WP/10/281.
Borensztein, Eduardo and Ugo Panizza (2009). “The Costs of Sovereign Default”. In: IMF Staff Papers
56.4, pp. 683–741.
Brutti, Filippo (2011). “Sovereign Defaults and Liquidity Crises”. In: Journal of International Economics
84.1, pp. 65–72.
Caliendo, Lorenzo and Fernando Parro (2015). “Estimates of the Trade and Welfare Effects of NAFTA”.
In: Review of Economic Studies 82.1, pp. 1–44.
Calvo, Guillermo A. (2014). “Servicing the Public Debt: The Role of Expectations”. In: American Eco-
nomic Review 78.4, pp. 647–661.
Chaney, Thomas (2008). “Distorted Gravity: The Intensive and Extensive Margins of International Trade”.
In: American Economic Review 98.4, pp. 1707–1721.
Chaney, Thomas and Ralph Ossa (2013). “Market Size, Division of Labor, and Firm Productivity”. In:
Journal of International Economics 90.1, pp. 177–180.
Cheng, Gong, Javier Diaz-Cassou, and Aitor Erce (2018). “Official Debt Restructurings and Develop-
ment”. In: World Development 111.November 2018, pp. 181–195.
27
Cimadomo, Jacopo, Peter Claeys, and Marcos Poplawski-Ribeiro (2016). “How Do Experts Forecast
Sovereign Spreads?” In: European Economic Review 87.August 2016, pp. 216–235.
Coeurdacier, Nicolas, Hélène Rey, and Pablo Winant (2018). “Financial Integration and Growth in a
Risky World”. NBER Working Paper No. 21817.
Costinot, Arnaud and Andrés Rodríguez-Clare (2014). “Trade Theory with Numbers: Quantifying the
Consequences of Globalization”. In:Handbook of International Economics, Vol. 4. Ed. by Gita Gopinath,
Elhanan Helpman, and Kenneth Rogoff. New York: Elsevier.
Cuadra, Gabriel and Horacio Sapriza (2006). “Sovereign Default, Terms of Trade and Interest Rates in
Emerging Markets”. Banco de Mexico Working Papers No. 2006-01.
Das, Udaibir S., Michael G. Papaioannou, and Christoph Trebesch (2012). “Sovereign Debt Restructurings
1950–2010: Literature Survey, Data, and Stylized Facts”. IMF working Paper WP/12/203.
De Paoli, Bianca, Glenn Hoggarth, and Victoria Saporta (2006). “Costs of Sovereign Default”. In: Bank
of England Quarterly Bulletin 46.3, pp. 297–307.
Detragiache, Enrica and Antonio Spilimbergo (2001). “Crises and Liquidity: Evidence and Interpretation”.
IMF Working Paper WP/01/2.
Eaton, Jonathan and Mark Gersovitz (1981). “Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empir-
ical Analysis”. In: Review of Economic Studies 48.2, pp. 289–309.
Eaton, Jonathan and Samuel Kortum (2003). “Technology, Geography, and Trade”. In: Econometrica
70.5, pp. 1741–1779.
Edwards, Sebastian (2004). “Financial Openness, Sudden Stops, and Current-Account Reversals”. In:
American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 94.2, pp. 59–64.
Feenstra, Robert C. (2018a). “Restoring the Product Variety and Pro-competitive Gains from Trade with
Heterogeneous Firms and Bounded Productivity”. In: Journal of International Economics 110.January
2018, pp. 16–27.
— (2018b). “Alternative Sources of the Gains from International Trade: Variety, Creative Destruction,
and Markups”. In: Journal of Economic Perspectives 32.2, pp. 25–46.
Feenstra, Robert C., Robert Inklaar, and Marcel P. Timmer (2015). “The Next Generation of the Penn
World Table”. In: American Economic Review 105.10, pp. 3150–3182.
Furceri, Davide and Aleksandra Zdzienicka (2012). “How Costly are Debt Crises?” In: Journal of Inter-
national Money and Finance 4.December 2016, pp. 726–742.
Gelos, R. Gaston, Ratna Sahay, and Guido Sandleris (2011). “Sovereign Borrowing by Developing Coun-
tries: What Determines Market Access?” In: Journal of International Economics 83.2, pp. 243–254.
Gopinath, Gita and Brent Neiman (2014). “Trade Adjustment and Productivity in Large Crises”. In:
American Economic Review 104.3, pp. 793–831.
Gu, Grace W. (2018). “Sovereign Default, Trade, and Terms of Trade”. Unpublished manuscript, UC
Santa Cruz.
Hussey, Robert and George Tauchen (1991). “Quadrature-Based Methods for Obtaining Approximate
Solutions to Nonlinear Asset Pricing Models”. In: Econometrica 59.2, pp. 371–396.
IMF (2018a). Direction of Trade Statistics. Washington D.C.
— (2018b). International Financial Statistics. Washington D.C.
28
Kennan, John and Raymond Riezman (1988). “Do Big Countries Win Tariff Wars?” In: International
Economic Review 29.1, pp. 81–85.
Kletzer, Kenneth M. and Pranab Kumar Bardhan (1987). “Credit Markets and Patterns of International
Trade”. In: Journal of Development Economics 27.1-2, pp. 57–70.
Kollmann, Robert (1996). “Incomplete Asset Markets and the Cross-Country Consumption Correlation
Puzzle”. In: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 20.5, pp. 945–961.
Krugman, Paul R (1980). “Scale Economies, Product Differentiation, and the Pattern of Trade”. In:
American Economic Review 70.5, pp. 950–959.
Kuvshinov, Dmitry and Kasper Zimmermann (2017). “Sovereign Going Bust: Estimating the Cost of
Default”. Unpublished manuscript, University of Bonn.
Laeven, Luc and Fabian Valencia (2008). “Systematic Banking Crises: A New Database”. IMF Working
Paper WP/08/224.
Levy-Yeyati, Eduardo and Ugo Panizza (2011). “The Elusive Costs of Sovereign Defaults”. In: Journal of
Development Economics 94.1, pp. 95–105.
Manasse, Paolo and Nouriel Roubini (2009). ““Rules of Thumb” for Sovereign Debt Crises”. In: Journal
of International Economics 78.2, pp. 192–205.
Manova, Kalina (2013). “Credit Constraints, Heterogeneous Firms, and International Trade”. In: Review
of Economic Studies 80.2, pp. 711–744.
Martinez, Jose Vicente and Guido Sandleris (2011). “Is It Punishment? Sovereign Defaults and the Decline
in Trade”. In: Journal of International Money and Finance 30.6, pp. 909–930.
Matsuyama, Kiminori (2005). “Credit Market Imperfections and Patterns of International Trade and
Capital Flows”. In: Journal of the European Economic Association 3.2-3, pp. 714–723.
Melitz, Marc J. (2003). “The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate Industry
Productivity”. In: Econometrica 71.6, pp. 1695–1725.
Melitz, Marc J. and Stephen J. Redding (2014). “Missing Gains from Trade?” In: American Economic
Review Papers and Proceedings 104.5, pp. 317–321.
— (2015). “New Trade Models, NewWeifare lmplications”. In:American Economic Review 105.3, pp. 1105–
1146.
Mendoza, Enrique G. (1991). “Real Business Cycles in a Small Open Economy”. In: American Economic
Review 81.4, pp. 797–818.
Mendoza, Enrique G. and Vivian Z. Yue (2012). “A General Equilibrium Model of Sovereign Default and
Business Cycles”. In: Quarterly Journal of Economics 127.2, pp. 889–946.
Ossa, Ralph (2015). “Why Trade Matters After All”. In: Journal of International Economics 97.2, pp. 266–
277.
Perez, Diego J. (2015). “Sovereign Debt, Domestic Banks and the Provision of Public Liquidity”. Unpub-
lished manuscript, NYU.
Ramanarayanan, Ananth (2018). “Imported Inputs and the Gains from Trade”. Unpublished manuscript,
University of Western Ontario.
Reinhart, Carmen M., Kenneth S. Rogoff, and Miguel A. Savastano (2003). “Debt Intolerance”. In: Brook-
ings Papers on Economic Activity 34.2003-1, pp. 1–74.
Romalis, John (2007). “Market Access, Openness and Growth”. NBER Working Paper No. 13048.
29
Rose, Andrew K. (2005). “One Reason Countries Pay their Debts: Renegotiation and International Trade”.
In: Journal of Development Economics 77.1, pp. 189–206.
Rose, Andrew K. and Mark M. Spiegel (2004). “A Gravity Model of Sovereign Lending: Trade, Default,
and Credit”. In: IMF Staff Papers 51.1, pp. 50–63.
Schularick, Moritz and Thomas M. Steger (2010). “Financial Integration, Investment, and Economic
Growth: Evidence from Two Eras of Financial Globalization”. In: Review of Economics and Statistics
92.4, pp. 756–768.
Simonovska, Ina and Michael E. Waugh (2014). “Trade Models, Trade Elasticities, and the Gains from
Trade”. NBER Working Paper No. 20495.
Singh, Kavaljit (2015). “Who Owns Greece’s Debt”. Available at: https://www.globalresearch.ca/who-
owns-greeces-debt/5460265.
Stangebye, Zachary R. (2016). “Lifetime-Laffer Curves and the Eurozone Crisis”. Unpublished manuscript,
University of Notre Dame.
Sturzenegger, Federico and Jeromin Zettelmeyer (2007). Debt Defaults and Lessons from a Decade of
Crises. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Trebesch, Christoph and Michael Zabel (2017). “The Output Costs of Hard and Soft Sovereign Default”.
In: European Economic Review 92.February 2017, pp. 416–432.
U.S. Department of the Treasury (2018). “Securities (B): Portfolio Holdings of U.S. and Foreign Securities,
Table A1”. Available at: https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Pages/ticsec2.aspx.
World Bank (2018a). Global Financial Development Database. Washington D.C.
— (2018b). World Development Indicators. Washington D.C.
Yue, Vivian Z. (2010). “Sovereign Default and Debt Renegotiation”. In: Journal of International Eco-
nomics 80.2, pp. 176–187.
Zame, William R. (1993). “Efficiency and the Role of Default When Security Markets Are Incomplete”.
In: American Economic Review 83.5, pp. 1142–1164.
Zymek, Robert (2012). “Sovereign Default, International Lending, and Trade”. In: IMF Economic Review
60.3, pp. 365–394.
30
Appendix
A Pre-transfer consumption schedules in autarky and free trade
This section shows that there is a threshold value of Y such that if the endowment is below that
amount, costs of default would be greater under free trade than under autarky. We also show numerically
that the threshold is very large under reasonable parameter values.
Figure 1 illustrates the pre-transfer consumption schedules under autarky and free trade, as functions
of Y . It assumes that Y ∗ is fixed. The two schedules are as defined in equations (5) and (6):
cAUT (Y ) = Y
cFT (Y ) = Y
[
1 + φ−1pσ−1
] 1
σ−1
= Y · g(p) > Y.
Given these schedules, the costs of default are represented by the slope of the consumption schedules. If
the slope is greater, then the loss of consumption due to a default is greater.
We know that both consumptions will be zero when the endowment Y is zero. c
AUT (0) = 0
lim
Y
+→0
cFT (Y ) = 0.
Also, as Y goes to infinity, gains from trade will disappear (g(p)→ 1), and the two consumption schedules
will converge as described as follows:
lim
Y→∞
(cFT (Y )− cAUT (Y )) = 0.
In addition, positive gains from trade, g(p) > 1, assure that consumption under free trade is greater than
that under autarky.
cFT (Y ) > cAUT (Y ) ∀ Y ∈ (0,∞).
Therefore, using the mean value theorem, there exists at least one Y ∈ (0,∞) such that the slope of the
free trade consumption is equal to that under autarky.
∃ Y¯ ∈ (0,∞) s.t. ∂c
FT (Y )
∂Y
= ∂c
AUT (Y )
∂Y
= 1. (A.1)
Take a sequence of {Y¯ } that satisfies equation (A.1), and order them as {Y¯ i}, i = 1,2,... so that Y¯ i < Y¯ i+1
for all i. For all values of Y such that Y < Y¯ , the slope of the consumption schedule is greater under free
trade than autarky, meaning that default costs are also greater.
Figure A1 plots numerically determined Y¯ ’s, relative to Y¯ ∗. As elasticity of substitution increases,
the gains from trade diminish thus the terms of trade effects dominate. This lowers the value of Y¯ . Also,
as foreign bias increases, the terms of trade deteriorates since the foreign country values home’s good less.
This pushes up the value of Y¯ . Lastly, a change in the sovereign’s home bias has an ambiguous effect
on Y¯ . An increase in home bias improves its terms of trade, but at the same time the sovereign values
imported goods less.
Nevertheless, one can see from these plots that, under reasonable parameters — σ ≈ 5, and the home
bias parameter is greater than 0.5 — the value of Y¯ is very large. In the numerical exercise in Section 4,
the variable space comfortably fits into the region where Y < Y¯ .
A1
Figure A1: The level of endowment Y¯ with different parameter values
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Panel B: Y¯ when λ∗ = 0.5
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Notes: The figure shows the relationship between Y¯ , the level of endowment with ∂C/∂Y |AUT = ∂C/∂Y |FT , and the
elasticity of substitution σ for different values of λ and λ∗.
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B Data
B.1 Data sources
Variables Data sources
• Default episodes Asonuma and Trebesch (2016)
De Paoli et al. (2006)
Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2001)
Kuvshinov and Zimmermann (2017)
Furceri and Zdzienicka (2012)
Levy-Yeyati and Panizza (2011)
Laeven and Valencia (2008)
Reinhart et al. (2003)
Trebesch and Zabel (2017)
• Paris Club debt restructuring episodes Das et al. (2012)
• Interest rates on external debt (private creditors) International Financial Statistics (IMF, 2018b)
• Interest rates on external debt (official creditors) International Financial Statistics (IMF, 2018b)
• Openness Penn World Table (Feenstra et al., 2015)
• GDP (constant USD) World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2018b)
• GDP per capita (constant USD) World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2018b)
• GDP growth rate (constant USD) World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2018b)
• Total interest payments-to-GDP ratio GFDD (World Bank, 2018a)
• Public debt-to-GDP ratio GFDD (World Bank, 2018a)
• Political stability index International Country Risk Guide, The PRS Group, Inc.
• Inflation rates World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2018b)
• Tariffs applied (weighted average of all products) World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2018b)
• Credit ratings Institutional Investor Magazine
Notes: GFDD indicates the Global Financial Development Database. The data on default episodes in
De Paoli et al. (2006), Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2001), Levy-Yeyati and Panizza (2011), Laeven and
Valencia (2008), and Reinhart et al. (2003) are retrieved from a summary table in Furceri and Zdzienicka
(2012). The political stability index is the mean of seven political stability indices including government
stability, socioeconomic conditions, investment profiles, internal conflicts, external conflicts, corruption,
and military in politics.
A3
B.2 Summary statistics
Table A1 presents summary statistics of variables used in Table 1. Table A2 presents summary
statistics of variables used in Tables 2 and 3. Summary statistics of additional variables for robustness
checks in Appendix D are presented in Table A3. These summary statistics are for the sample used in
column (1) of each of the regression tables. Therefore, the sample sizes are the same for some variables.
Table A1: Summary statistics for the sample in Table 1
Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Number of defaults 124 1.52 1.94 0 7
Openness 124 0.37 0.36 0 1.98
ln(GDP per capita) 87 7.74 1.52 4.97 10.22
ln(GDP) 87 23.42 2.29 18.81 29.10
Debt-to-GDP ratio 84 29.23 30.38 0 152.05
Political stability index 102 3.96 2.34 0 7.75
Table A2: Summary statistics for the sample in Tables 2 and 3
Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Interest rates on external debt (private creditors) 2,943 4.02 4.12 0 20.28
Openness 2,943 0.49 0.44 0 2.77
Medium-sized country dummy × Openness 2,943 0.24 0.41 0 2.44
Large country dummy × Openness 2,943 0.14 0.31 0 2.77
Short-term interest payments 1,731 0.21 0.28 0 1.85
GDP growth rate 2,869 0.04 0.09 -0.54 1.09
ln(GDP per capita) 2,622 8.00 1.61 4.74 11.36
Debt-to-GDP ratio 1,584 0.54 0.43 0 2.22
ln(1+Inflation rate/100) 2,681 0.15 0.39 -0.32 4.92
Arrears/GNI ratio 2,499 0.00 0.02 0 0.20
Default dummy 2,943 0.03 0.16 0 1
Table A3: Summary statistics for additional variables for robustness checks
Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Paris Club debt restructuring dummy 1,342 0.03 0.18 0 1
Total number of Paris Club debt restructurings 124 1.44 1.97 0 7
Interest rates on external debt (official creditors) 1,052 3.20 3.28 0 13.87
Credit ratings (100 = best, 0 = worst) 1,342 33.31 22.33 0 95.87
Tariffs, ln(1 + Tc/100) 1,342 0.08 0.08 0 1.65
Tariffs imposed by other countries, ln(1 + TOtherc /100) 1,342 0.01 0.01 0 0.10
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C Sample countries
C.1 Sample countries for Figures 2 and 3
Figures 2 and 3 are based on 125 countries where openness data are available. The least open countries
(openness is less than the 50th percentile) are the following 62 countries:
Albania, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Benin, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo
Verde, Cambodia, Central African Rep., Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Ecuador, Egypt,
Ethiopia, France, Gambia, Greece, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Japan, Lao People’s Dem.
Rep., Lebanon, Malawi, Maldives, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua,
Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Rep. of Korea, Ro-
mania, Rwanda, Seychelles, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Togo, Turkey, Uganda,
United Arab Emirates, United Rep. of Tanzania, Uruguay, USA, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe.
The moderately open countries (openness is between the 50th and the 75th percentiles) are the following
31 countries:
Algeria, Austria, Bolivia, Cameroon, Canada, Macao SAR (China), Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire,
Cyprus, Denmark, El Salvador, Finland, Germany, Guatemala , Honduras, Hungary, Is-
rael, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Madagascar, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, New Zealand,
Panama, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Switzerland, Tunisia, and the United Kingdom.
The most open countries (openness is greater than the 75th percentile) are the following 32 countries:
Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bermuda,
Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Hong Kong SAR (China), Dominican Rep., Fiji, Iceland, Ire-
land, Kuwait, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Namibia, Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Qatar,
Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Suriname, Sweden, Trinidad and
Tobago, and Zambia.
C.2 Sample countries for Table 2
Regressions in Table 2 are based on 70 countries and introduce dummy variables for large countries
and medium-sized countries based on GDP data from 1995. The large countries (GDP is greater than
the 75th percentile) are the following 21 countries:
Brazil, Canada, Hong Kong SAR (China), Colombia, France, India, Jamaica, Japan, Mal-
dives, Mexico, Myanmar, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, South Africa, Spain,
Switzerland, Thailand, and Turkey
The medium-sized countries (GDP is between the 25th and the 75th percentiles) are the following 32
countries:
Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bolivia, Botswana, Cameroon, Chile, Costa Rica,
Cyprus, Egypt, Estonia, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Luxembourg,
Malta, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine,
Uruguay, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe
The small countries (GDP is less than the 25th percentile) are the following 17 countries:
Armenia, Aruba, Belize, Bermuda, Central African Rep., Gambia, Guinea, Madagascar,
Malawi, Mauritius, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Niger, Rep. of Moldova, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and
Nevis, and Suriname
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C.3 Sample countries for Table 3
Regressions in Table 3 are based on 144 countries and introduce dummy variables for large countries
and medium-sized countries based on GDP data from 1995. The large countries (GDP is greater than
the 75th percentile) are the following 35 countries:
Antigua and Barbuda, Armenia, Aruba, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bermuda, Bosnia Herze-
govina, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Central African Rep., Fiji, Gambia,
Georgia, Guinea, Lao People’s Dem. Rep., Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mon-
golia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Rep. of Moldova, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint
Lucia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Suriname, Togo, and United Arab Emirates
The medium-sized countries (GDP is between the 25th and the 75th percentiles) are the following 69
countries:
Albania, Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Belarus, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei
Darussalam, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Chile, Macao SAR (China), Congo, Costa Rica, Côte
d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Dominican Rep., Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia,
Ethiopia, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Jordan, Kazakhstan,
Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Morocco, Namibia, Nepal, New
Zealand, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Senegal,
Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Macedonia, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda,
Ukraine, United Rep. of Tanzania, Uruguay, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe
The small countries (GDP is less than the 25th percentile) are the following 40 countries:
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Hong Kong SAR (China),
Colombia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Italy, Jamaica,
Japan, Lithuania, Maldives, Mexico, Montenegro, Myanmar, Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Qatar, Rep. of Korea, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzer-
land, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, and USA
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D Robustness checks
D.1 Paris Club debt restructurings
Section 3 in the main text examines the openness effects on countries’ defaults on their debt owned
by, and the bond interest rates for, private creditors. This is because our theoretical model implicitly
assumes that a country’s debt is owned by private creditors — due to the assumption that there are many
and animistic creditors. However, it is important to consider debt restructurings with official creditors in
the empirical context because official creditors have played a critical role in debt restructurings (Cheng
et al., 2018). As explained in Das et al. (2012) and Cheng et al. (2018), since 1956 the Paris Club has
conducted debt rescheduling negotiation with creditors in an organized manner.
The purpose of this section is to show our empirical results presented in the main text also hold true
even if we consider creditors in the public sector. We examine the effect of openness on Paris Club debt
restructurings, which are debt negotiations with creditors from the public sector, and the bond interest
rate for official public sector creditors.
Figure A2: Average number of Paris Club debt restructurings by the degree of openness
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Notes: The figure shows the average number of defaults for countries in each group. The default episodes come from Das et al.
(2012). The most open countries are defined as countries where their openness measures are greater than the 75th percentile
of distribution in 1970. The moderately open countries are those between the 50th percentile and the 75th percentile. The
least open countries are those less than the 50th percentile. Because there are serial Paris Club debt restructurings that
should be considered as one episode, the figure drops episodes occurred in the following years of another Paris Club debt
restructurings in the same country. See Appendix C for a list of these groups of countries.
We employ the data on Paris Club debt restructurings from Das et al. (2012), covering episodes
during 1950-2010. We only use the data after 1970, covering 411 episodes. See Das et al. (2012) for a list
of debt restructuring episodes. Figure A2 shows the average number of Paris Club debt restructurings
between 1970 and 2010 for three groups of countries — most open countries (openness is greater than the
75th percentile), moderately open countries (between the 50th and the 75th percentiles), and least open
countries (less than the 50th percentile) based on the openness data in 1970. It indicates that the least
open countries experienced, on average, almost two Paris Club debt restructurings during the period. On
the other hand, the most open countries had only 0.5 debt restructurings on average. The moderately
open countries are in the middle of the two groups of countries in terms of its average number of debt
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restructurings. These results suggest that Paris Club debt restructurings are mainly conducted in less
open countries.
We also use a panel dataset to investigate the relationship between openness and the bond’s interest
rate charged by official creditors and to examine if the openness effects vary by country size. Table
A4 summarizes results from estimating equations (9) and (10) by employing the bonds’ interest rate
for official creditors as the dependent variable. Column (5), introducing the largest number of control
variables, shows that a 100 percentage points increase in openness reduces the bonds’ interest rate by
2.18 percent in small countries. Estimated marginal effects of openness, reported in the bottom of the
table, are insignificant for middle-sized countries and large countries. However, the size of the coefficients
are consistent with the theory — the openness effects are smaller for larger countries. The results are
qualitatively similar to the ones presented in Table 2.
Table A4: Openness effects on the bonds’ interest rates for official creditors
Dependent variable = the bonds’ interest rates for official creditors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Openness -1.101* -1.411** -4.439*** -4.001*** -2.180*
(0.568) (0.695) (0.907) (1.026) (1.291)
DMedium× Openness -0.302 -0.464 -0.274 1.033
(1.086) (1.417) (1.485) (1.330)
DLarge× Openness 3.628*** 4.219 3.604 4.652
(1.126) (3.508) (3.940) (4.041)
DMedium × ft and DLarge × ft X X X X
R-squared 0.107 0.111 0.198 0.199 0.214
Observations 2,943 2,943 1,701 1,613 1,100
Countries 70 70 57 57 55
Controls
Interest payments-to-GDP ratio X X X
GDP growth rate X X
ln(GDP per capita) X X
Debt-to-GDP ratio X
Inflation rate X
Default dummy X
Linear combination of coefficients
Medium-sized countries -1.713 -4.903*** -4.275*** -1.147
(0.835) (1.055) (1.046) (1.498)
Large countries 2.216** -0.220 -0.398 2.472
(0.886) (3.369) (3.759) (4.038)
Notes: The dependent variable is the bonds’ interest rates. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively. Standard errors, clustered at the country-level, are in parentheses. All regressions include a constant
term and country fixed effects. Columns (2)-(5) introduce interaction terms year fixed effects ft and DMedium (or DLarge)
in order to identify the openness effects in medium-sized countries (or large countries). See Appendix C for a list of these
groups of countries.
Table A5 shows results from estimating equation (11) by replacing the private-sector default dummy
with the Paris Club debt restructuring dummy. The table is presented in the same manner as for Table 3.
Column (5) shows that a 100 percentage increase in openness reduces the probability of Paris Club debt
restructuring by 40.7 percent in small countries. The same change in openness reduces the probability
of debt restructuring by 16.4 percent and 11.9 percent in medium-sized and large countries, respectively.
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Again, the results summarized in Table A5 are essentially the same as the ones in Table 3.
Overall, the empirical analyses presented in this section show that the model’s theoretical predictions
are consistent with the data even if we consider countries’ debt restructurings with official creditors —
Paris Club debt restructurings — and the interest rates on external debt for creditors from the public
sector. To summarize, a greater openness reduces the probability of debt restructurings and the bonds’
interest rate. Also, these openness effects are greater for small countries than larger countries.
Table A5: Openness effects on the probability of Paris Club debt restructurings, Logit
Dependent variable = the Paris Club debt restructuring dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Openness, small countries -0.068*** -0.136*** -0.128*** -0.130*** -0.407**
(0.022) (0.044) (0.044) (0.050) (0.197)
Observations 1,446 959 944 944 295
Countries 35 29 29 29 14
Openness, medium-sized countries -0.098*** -0.090*** -0.081*** -0.088*** -0.164*
(0.018) (0.028) (0.028) (0.031) (0.091)
Observations 2,787 1,621 1,592 1,575 548
Countries 69 59 59 58 27
Openness, large countries -0.077*** -0.061 -0.066 -0.199** -0.119
(0.022) (0.057) (0.056) (0.095) (0.135)
Observations 1,674 535 526 451 184
Countries 40 26 26 26 14
Controls
Interest payments-to-GDP ratio X X X X
GDP growth rate X X X
ln(GDP per capita) X X
Debt-to-GDP ratio X
Inflation rate X
Arrears-to-GNI ratio X
Notes: The table reports marginal effects of a 100 percentage point increase in openness. Delta-method standard errors are
in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. See Appendix C
for a list of these groups of countries.
D.2 Addressing potential endogeneity of openness
Openness is potentially subject to endogeneity. A sovereign default reduces imports and exports as
documented in a number of articles (e.g., Rose, 2005; Martinez and Sandleris, 2011; Zymek, 2012; and
Asonuma et al., 2016). Therefore, countries that experienced a default in the past may have a lower degree
of openness. Moreover, as shown in Asonuma (2016), a previously defaulted country is more likely to
have a default in the following years for the same value of debt-to-GDP ratio. As a result, a combination
of these facts results in a spurious negative relationship between openness and the default likelihood —
therefore the bonds’ interest rate — because a smaller openness caused by a previous default would seem
to be related with the next default that is actually caused by serial defaulters’ other characteristics. This
section addresses this potential issue by using a 2SLS.
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D.2.1 Identification strategy
Our identification strategy is similar to Romalis (2007) where he examines the effect of trade openness
on countries’ GDP growth rates by instrumenting openness by tariffs. A reduction of tariffs increases
imports of the country, which increases its openness. One may argue that tariffs do not satisfy the
exclusion restriction because it directly affects the likelihood of default by changing the country’s tariff
revenue, therefore its overall fiscal revenue. However, countries’ tariff revenue accounts for a small share
of the overall fiscal revenue. As of 1970, for example, the medium share of tariff revenue in total fiscal
revenue is eight percent according to the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2018b). Therefore,
we argue that tariffs do not have a statistically significant direct effect on our dependent variables. Also,
statistical tests suggest that tariffs are indeed a valid instrument (see Sargan statistics in Tables A6 and
A7).
We also employ the average tariff rate applied by all other countries besides the country as instrument.
The variable is defined as follows: TOtherc =
∑N
k 6=c Tk/(N − 1) where Tc denotes tariff rates applied by
country c and N is the number of countries that tariff data are available. A reduction of tariffs applied
by all other countries increases exports from the country, which increases openness. However, changes in
tariffs applied by all other countries do not affect the country’s default likelihood and the bond interest
rate other than through openness. Therefore, this variable is a valid instrument. These tariffs variables
are introduced to regression as ln(1 + Tc/100) and ln(1 + TOtherc /100), respectively.
Regressions in the main text introduce interaction terms between openness and country size dummy
variables in order to investigate if the openness effects vary across countries. However, instead of intro-
ducing interaction terms, in this section we split the sample into two groups — small countries and larger
countries (medium-sized and large countries) — because it is hard to instrument both openness and its
interaction terms. We divide the sample to two groups (instead of three groups) in order to keep the
sample size as great as possible because IV estimates lose consistency for a small sample. Small countries
are classified as one group because we are particularly interested in openness effects in small countries.
D.2.2 The bonds’ interest rate
Table A6 shows results from estimating the openness effects on the bonds’ interest rates. It uses
the same sets of controls as for Table 2. Panel A shows results with a full sample, suggesting that a
1 percentage point increase in openness reduces the bonds’ interest rates by 0.11 to 0.21 percent. The
openness effects are statistically significant at the 1 percent level in all columns. Results from small
countries and medium-sized & large countries are presented in Panels B and C, respectively. These show
that small countries have greater openness effects than larger countries. A 1 percentage point increase
in openness reduces the bonds’ interest rates by 0.16 to 0.40 percent in small countries. On the other
hand, the same increase in openness reduces the bond interest rates by 0.10 to 0.14 percent only in larger
countries. These results are qualitatively similar to the ones in Table 2.
D.2.3 Countries’ credit ratings
We are also interested in the effect of openness on the default likelihood. However, it is hard find the
instrumented effect of openness on the default probability because the dependent variable is a default
dummy, which takes either 0 or 1, and it is not a continuous variable. Note that the instrumented openness
effects are the local average treatment effect of changes in openness caused by changes in tariffs. If the
dependent variable were a dummy taking 1 only if there is a default, we observe an event of default at
an extreme situation that a country cannot repay its debt. A change in tariffs alters openness, which in
turn affects the default probability but we do not observe a default event unless the change in the default
probability is extreme. As a result, the local average treatment effect of changes in openness caused by
tariffs would be seriously biased. Therefore, we employ countries’ credit ratings as a proxy of default
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probability. Data on credit ratings are retrieved from the Institutional Investor Magazine. It takes a
value between 0 and 100 and a greater value means that its credit rating is better.
Table A6: Openness effects on the bonds’ interest rate for private creditors, 2SLS
Dependent variable = the bonds’ interest rate for private creditors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Full sample
Openness -0.113*** -0.133*** -0.142*** -0.213***
(0.021) (0.027) (0.033) (0.064)
Observations 1,051 698 668 472
Countries 69 46 44 43
Cragg-Donald Wald F -stat. 10.58 15.76 13.14 2.71
Sargan stat. 0.407 0.241 0.278 0.001
p-value of Sargan stat. 0.524 0.623 0.598 0.980
Panel B: Small countries
Openness -0.166*** -0.160*** -0.157*** -0.402**
(0.053) (0.051) (0.056) (0.188)
Observations 255 202 201 136
Countries 17 13 13 13
Cragg-Donald Wald F -stat. 48.87 33.32 21.89 9.15
Sargan stat. 0.446 2.181 2.481 1.023
p-value of Sargan stat. 0.504 0.140 0.115 0.312
Panel C: Medium-sized and large countries
Openness -0.094*** -0.122*** -0.139*** -0.128**
(0.021) (0.033) (0.041) (0.065)
Observations 796 496 467 336
Countries 52 33 31 30
Cragg-Donald Wald F -stat. 52.27 49.49 33.77 11.39
Sargan stat. 0.153 0.000 0.005 0.060
p-value of Sargan stat. 0.695 0.988 0.942 0.806
Controls
Interest payments-to-GDP ratio X X X
GDP growth rate X X
ln(GDP per capita) X X
Debt-to-GDP ratio X
Inflation rate X
Default dummy X
Notes: The table shows the effect of a 1 percentage point increase in openness on the bonds’ interest rate for private creditors.
Openness is instrumented by the tariff rate applied by a country and the average tariff rate applied by all other countries
besides that country. All regressions include a constant term and country fixed effects. ***, **, and * indicate statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. See Appendix C for a list of
these groups of countries.
Table A7 shows results from estimating regressions employing countries’ credit ratings as the de-
pendent variable. A greater openness raises the country’s credit rating. Therefore, we expect positive
coefficients for openness. Panel A describes results from using a full sample. It shows that a 1 percentage
point increase in openness raises credit ratings by 0.74 to 0.95. The openness effects are statistically
significant at the 1 percent level in all columns.
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Results from using small countries and medium-sized & large countries are presented in Panels B and
C, respectively. These show that the openness effects are greater for small countries than larger countries.
A 1 percentage point increase in openness raises credit ratings by 0.9 to 1.1 in small countries. On the
other hand, the same increase in openness raises credit ratings by 0.56 to 0.89 only in larger countries.
Overall, these results suggest the estimated effects of openness are consistent with the model’s theoretical
predictions.
Table A7: Openness effects on countries’ credit ratings, 2SLS
Dependent variable = credit ratings (100 = best, and 0 = worst)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Full sample
Openness 0.737*** 0.954*** 0.800*** 0.820***
(0.063) (0.102) (0.111) (0.140)
Observations 1,327 943 922 905
Countries 107 77 74 74
Cragg-Donald Wald F -stat. 85.30 53.37 35.21 23.77
Sargan stat. 0.007 0.015 0.063 0.030
p-value of Sargan stat. 0.932 0.903 0.802 0.862
Panel B: Small countries
Openness 0.906*** 1.145*** 1.047*** 1.129***
(0.204) (0.255) (0.275) (0.367)
Observations 363 299 299 289
Countries 29 24 24 24
Cragg-Donald Wald F -stat. 12.58 10.08 7.68 4.94
Sargan stat. 0.003 0.042 0.026 0.045
p-value of Sargan stat. 0.955 0.838 0.871 0.833
Panel C: Medium-sized and large countries
Openness 0.686*** 0.885*** 0.632*** 0.560***
(0.059) (0.103) (0.105) (0.116)
Observations 964 644 623 616
Countries 78 53 50 50
Cragg-Donald Wald F -stat. 85.98 49.73 30.62 22.67
Sargan stat. 0.048 0.492 0.405 0.471
p-value of Sargan stat. 0.827 0.483 0.524 0.493
Controls
Interest payments-to-GDP ratio X X X
GDP growth rate X X
ln(GDP per capita) X X
Debt-to-GDP ratio X
Inflation rate X
Default dummy X
Notes: The table shows the effect of a 1 percentage point increase in openness on countries’ credit ratings (100 = best, and
0 = worst). Openness is instrumented by the tariff rate applied by a country and the average tariff rate applied by all other
countries besides that country. All regressions include a constant term and country fixed effects. ***, **, and * indicate
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. See Appendix C for a
list of these groups of countries.
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E Default episodes
Table A8: Default episodes
No. Country name (ISO) Year No. Country name (ISO) Year No. Country name (ISO) Year
Asonuma and Trebesch (2016) 41 Madagascar (MDG) 1981 82 Tanzania (TZA) 1981
1 Albania (ALB) 1991 42 Madagascar (MDG) 1982 83 Togo (TGO) 1987
2 Algeria (DZA) 1993 43 Madagascar (MDG) 1985 84 Togo (TGO) 1991
3 Argentina (ARG) 1982 44 Madagascar (MDG) 1987 85 Turkey (TUR) 1976
4 Argentina (ARG) 1988 45 Malawi (MWI) 1987 86 Uganda (UGA) 1979
5 Argentina (ARG) 2001 46 Mauritania (MRT) 1992 87 Venezuela, RB (VEN) 1983
6 Bolivia (BOL) 1980 47 Moldova (MDA) 2001 88 Venezuela, RB (VEN) 1989
7 Bolivia (BOL) 1988 48 Morocco (MAR) 1983 89 Vietnam (VNM) 1982
8 Bosnia and H. (BIH) 1992 49 Mozambique (MOZ) 1983 90 Yemen, Rep. (YEM) 1983
9 Brazil (BRA) 1986 50 Nicaragua (NIC) 1978 91 Zaire (COD) 1975
10 Brazil (BRA) 1989 51 Nicaragua (NIC) 1983 92 Zaire (COD) 1982
11 Bulgaria (BGR) 1990 52 Nicaragua (NIC) 1985 93 Zaire (COD) 1983
12 Cameroon (CMR) 1985 53 Niger (NER) 1986 94 Zaire (COD) 1984
13 Congo, Rep. (COG) 1983 54 Nigeria (NGA) 1982 95 Zaire (COD) 1985
14 Congo, Rep. (COG) 1988 55 Nigeria (NGA) 1983 96 Zaire (COD) 1986
15 Costa Rica (CRI) 1981 56 Nigeria (NGA) 1986 97 Zaire (COD) 1987
16 Costa Rica (CRI) 1984 57 Nigeria (NGA) 1987 98 Zambia (ZMB) 1983
17 Costa Rica (CRI) 1986 58 Nigeria (NGA) 1989 De Paoli et al. (2006)
18 Cote d’Ivoire (CIV) 1983 59 Pakistan (PAK) 1998 1 Albania (ALB) 1991
19 Cote d’Ivoire (CIV) 2000 60 Panama (PAN) 1987 2 Argentina (ARG) 1983
20 Croatia (HRV) 1992 61 Paraguay (PRY) 1986 3 Bulgaria (BGR) 1991
21 Dominican Rep. (DOM) 1982 62 Peru (PER) 1984 4 Bolivia (BOL) 1982
22 Dominican Rep. (DOM) 1987 63 Philippines (PHL) 1983 5 Brazil (BRA) 1983
23 Dominican Rep. (DOM) 2004 64 Poland (POL) 1981 6 Chile (CHL) 1983
24 Ecuador (ECU) 1986 65 Poland (POL) 1982 7 Cote d’Ivoire (CIV) 1987
25 Ecuador (ECU) 1999 66 Poland (POL) 1983 8 Congo, D.R. (COD) 1970
26 Ecuador (ECU) 2008 67 Poland (POL) 1986 9 Congo, D.R. (COD) 1983
27 Ethopia (ETH) 1990 68 Poland (POL) 1988 10 Costa Rica (CRI) 1985
28 Gabon (GAB) 1986 69 Poland (POL) 1989 11 Dominican R. (DOM) 1984
29 Gabon (GAB) 1989 70 Romania (ROU) 1981 12 Algeria (DZA) 1994
30 Gambia, The (GMB) 1984 71 Russia (RUS) 1991 13 Ecuador (ECU) 1987
31 Guinea (GIN) 1985 72 Russia (RUS) 1998 14 Georgia (GEO) 1994
32 Guinea (GIN) 1991 73 Russia (RUS) 1999 15 Grenada (GRD) 1987
33 Honduras (HND) 1981 74 Sao Tome & P. (STP) 1984 16 Guatemala (GTM) 1985
34 Honduras (HND) 1990 75 Senegal (SEN) 1981 17 Guyana (GUY) 1979
35 Iraq (IRQ) 1986 76 Senegal (SEN) 1992 18 Haiti (HTI) 1983
36 Jamaica (JAM) 1990 77 Serbia and M. (SRB) 1992 19 Indonesia (IDN) 1998
37 Jordan (JOR) 1989 78 Seychelles (SYC) 2008 20 Jordan (JOR) 1989
38 Kenya (KEN) 1992 79 Sierra Leone (SLE) 1980 21 Sri Lanka (LKA) 1990
39 Liberia (LBR) 1980 80 Slovenia (SVN) 1992 22 Morocco (MAR) 1983
40 Macedonia (MKD) 1992 81 Sudan (SDN) 1975 23 Mexico (MEX) 1982
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No. Country name (ISO) Year No. Country name (ISO) Year No. Country name (ISO) Year
24 Nigeria (NGA) 1987 27 Kenya (KEN) 1990 13 Cote d’Ivoire (CIV) 1983
25 Nicaragua (NIC) 1978 28 Korea, Rep. (KOR) 1998 14 Cote d’Ivoire (CIV) 2000
26 Nicaragua (NIC) 1985 29 Sri Lanka (LKA) 1992 15 Cameroon CMR) 1985
27 Panama (PAN) 1987 30 Lesotho (LSO) 1990 16 Congo, D.R. (COD) 1976
28 Peru (PER) 1983 31 Morocco (MAR 1985 17 Congo, Rep. (COG) 1983
29 Philippines (PHL) 1984 32 Madagascar (MDG) 1990 18 Costa Rica (CRI) 1981
30 Paraguay (PRY) 1983 33 Mexico (MEX) 1982 19 Dominican R. (DOM) 1982
31 Russia (RUS) 1990 34 Malawi (MWI) 1982 20 Algeria (DZA) 1991
32 Syria (SYR) 1986 35 Malawi (MWI) 1987 21 Ecuador (ECU) 1982
33 Togo (TGO) 1978 36 Niger (NER) 1984 22 Ecuador (ECU) 1999
34 Togo (TGO) 1991 37 Nigeria (NGA) 1972 23 Gabon (GAB) 1986
35 Trinidad and T. (TTO) 1989 38 Nigeria (NGA) 1986 24 Gabon (GAB) 1999
36 Venezuela (VEN) 1984 39 Nicaragua (NIC) 1978 25 Ghana (GHA) 1987
37 Zambia (ZMB) 1981 40 Panama (PAN) 1987 26 Guinea (GIN) 1986
Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2001) 41 Peru (PER) 1983 27 Guinea (GIN) 1991
1 Argentina (ARG) 1983 42 Philippines (PHL) 1984 28 Gambia, The (GMB) 1986
2 Burundi (BDI) 1986 43 Paraguay (PRY) 1984 29 Guinea-Bissau (GNB) 1983
3 Burkina Faso (BFA) 1986 44 Sudan (SDN) 1976 30 Guatemala (GTM) 1986
4 Bangladesh (BGD) 1978 45 Senegal (SEN) 1984 31 Guatemala (GTM) 1989
5 Bangladesh (BGD) 1991 46 Senegal (SEN) 1989 32 Guyana (GUY) 1979
6 Brazil (BRA) 1983 47 Sierra Leone (SLE) 1972 33 Guyana (GUY) 1982
7 Chile (CHL) 1973 48 El Salvador (SLV) 1984 34 Honduras (HND) 1981
8 Chile (CHL) 1983 49 El Salvador (SLV) 1995 35 Haiti (HTI) 1982
9 Cote d’Ivoire (CIV) 1987 50 Thailand (THA) 1998 36 Indonesia (IDN) 1998
10 Cameroon (CMR) 1979 51 Trinidad and T. (TTO) 1988 37 Jamaica (JAM) 1978
11 Cameroon (CMR) 1985 52 Tunisia (TUN) 1991 38 Jamaica (JAM) 1981
12 Congo, D.R. (COD) 1975 53 Venezuela (VEN) 1984 39 Jamaica (JAM) 1987
13 Colombia (COL) 1985 54 Zambia (ZMB) 1978 40 Jordan (JOR) 1989
14 Costa Rica (CRI) 1981 Kuvshinov and Zimmermann (2017) 41 Kenya (KEN) 1994
15 Dominican R. (DOM) 1976 1 Argentina (ARG) 1982 42 Kenya (KEN) 2000
16 Dominican R. (DOM) 1982 2 Argentina (ARG) 1989 43 Liberia (LBR) 1981
17 Algeria (DZA) 1991 3 Argentina (ARG) 2001 44 Morocco (MAR) 1983
18 Ecuador (ECU) 1983 4 Burkina Faso (BFA) 1983 45 Morocco (MAR) 1986
19 Egypt (EGY) 1986 5 Bulgaria (BGR) 1990 46 Moldova (MDA) 1998
20 Ethiopia (ETH) 1987 6 Bolivia (BOL) 1980 47 Madagascar (MDG) 1981
21 Guatemala (GTM) 1985 7 Bolivia (BOL) 1986 48 Mexico (MEX) 1982
22 Honduras (HND) 1976 8 Bolivia (BOL) 1989 49 Myanmar (MMR) 1997
23 Honduras (HND) 1983 9 Brazil (BRA) 1983 50 Mauritania (MRT) 1992
24 Haiti (HTI) 1983 10 Central Af. Rep. (CAF) 1981 51 Malawi (MWI) 1982
25 Indonesia (IDN) 1998 11 Central Af. Rep. (CAF) 1983 52 Malawi (MWI) 1988
26 Jordan (JOR) 1989 12 Chile (CHL) 1983 53 Niger (NER) 1983
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54 Nigeria (NGA) 1982 4 Dominican R. (DOM) 1982 23 Guinea (GIN) 1985
55 Nigeria (NGA) 2001 5 Dominican R. (DOM) 1999 24 Gambia, The (GMB) 1986
56 Nicaragua (NIC) 1979 6 Ecuador (ECU) 1999 25 Grenada (GRD) 2004
57 Pakistan (PAK) 1998 7 Indonesia (IDN) 1998 26 Guyana (GUY) 1982
58 Panama (PAN) 1983 8 Mexico (MEX) 1982 27 Honduras (HND) 1981
59 Panama (PAN) 1987 9 Nigeria (NGA) 1983 28 Indonesia (IDN) 1999
60 Peru (PER) 1976 10 Nigeria (NGA) 1986 29 Iran (IRN) 1992
61 Peru (PER) 1978 11 Pakistan (PAK) 1997 30 Jamaica (JAM) 1978
62 Peru (PER) 1980 12 Peru (PER) 1980 31 Jordan (JOR) 1989
63 Peru (PER) 1984 13 Peru (PER) 1983 32 Liberia (LBR) 1980
64 Philippines (PHL) 1983 14 Philippines (PHL) 1983 33 Morocco (MAR) 1983
65 Paraguay (PRY) 1986 15 Russia (RUS) 1991 34 Moldova (MDA) 2002
66 Romania (ROU) 1981 16 Russia (RUS) 1998 35 Madagascar (MDG) 1981
67 Romania (ROU) 1986 17 Ukraine (UKR) 1998 36 Mexico (MEX) 1982
68 Russia (RUS) 1998 18 Uruguay (URY) 1990 37 Mozambique (MOZ) 1984
69 Sudan (SDN) 1979 19 Uruguay (URY) 2003 38 Malawi (MWI) 1982
70 Senegal (SEN) 1981 20 South Africa (ZAF) 1985 39 Nicaragua (NIC) 1980
71 Senegal (SEN) 1990 21 South Africa (ZAF) 1989 40 Panama (PAN) 1983
72 Senegal (SEN) 1992 Laeven and Valencia (2008) 41 Peru (PER) 1978
73 Sierra Leone (SLE) 1983 1 Angola (AGO) 1988 42 Philippines (PHL) 1983
74 Sierra Leone (SLE) 1986 2 Albania (ALB) 1990 43 Poland (POL) 1981
75 Togo (TGO) 1979 3 Argentina (ARG) 1982 44 Paraguay (PRY) 1982
76 Togo (TGO) 1982 4 Argentina (ARG) 2001 45 Romania (ROU) 1982
77 Togo (TGO) 1988 5 Bulgaria (BGR) 1990 46 Russia (RUS) 1998
78 Togo (TGO) 1991 6 Bolivia (BOL) 1980 47 Sudan (SDN) 1979
79 Turkey (TUR) 1978 7 Brazil (BRA) 1983 48 Senegal (SEN) 1981
80 Turkey (TUR) 1982 8 Chile (CHL) 1983 49 Sierra Leone (SLE) 1977
81 Tanzania (TZA) 1984 9 Cote d’Ivoire (CIV) 1984 50 Togo (TGO) 1979
82 Uganda (UGA) 1980 10 Cote d’Ivoire (CIV) 2001 51 Trinidad and T. (TTO) 1989
83 Ukraine (UKR) 1998 11 Cameroon (CMR) 1989 52 Turkey (TUR) 1978
84 Uruguay (URY) 1983 12 Congo, D.R. (COD) 1976 53 Tanzania (TZA) 1984
85 Uruguay (URY) 1987 13 Congo, Rep. (COG) 1986 54 Uganda (UGA) 1981
86 Uruguay (URY) 1990 14 Costa Rica (CRI) 1981 55 Ukraine (UKR) 1998
87 Venezuela (VEN) 1983 15 Dominica (DMA) 2002 56 Uruguay (URY) 1983
88 Venezuela (VEN) 1990 16 Dominican R. (DOM) 1982 57 Uruguay (URY) 2002
89 Zambia (ZMB) 1983 17 Dominican R. (DOM) 2003 58 Venezuela (VEN) 1982
90 Zimbabwe (ZWE) 2000 18 Ecuador (ECU) 1982 59 Vietnam (VNM) 1985
Levy-Yeyati and Panizza (2011) 19 Ecuador (ECU) 1989 60 South Africa (ZAF) 1985
1 Argentina (ARG) 1982 20 Egypt (EGY) 1984 61 Zambia (ZMB) 1983
2 Argentina (ARG) 2001 21 Gabon (GAB) 1986
3 Chile (CHL) 1983 22 Gabon (GAB) 2002
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Reinhart et al. (2003) 8 Dominican R. (DOM) 1982
1 Albania (ALB) 1990 9 Dominican R. (DOM) 2004
2 Argentina (ARG) 1982 10 Algeria (DZA) 1991
3 Bulgaria (BGR) 1990 11 Ecuador (ECU) 1982
4 Bolivia (BOL) 1980 12 Ecuador (ECU) 1999
5 Brazil (BRA) 1983 13 Ecuador (ECU) 2008
6 Chile (CHL) 1972 14 Jordan (JOR) 1989
7 Costa Rica (CRI) 1981 15 Morocco (MAR) 1983
8 Dominican R. (DOM) 1982 16 Mexico (MEX) 1982
9 Ecuador (ECU) 1982 17 Nigeria (NGA) 1982
10 Ecuador (ECU) 1989 18 Pakistan (PAK) 1998
11 Ecuador (ECU) 1999 19 Panama (PAN) 1983
12 Egypt (EGY) 1984 20 Peru (PER) 1983
13 Guyana (GUY) 1982 21 Philippines (PHL) 1991
14 Honduras (HND) 1981 22 Poland (POL) 1991
15 Iran (IRN) 1992 23 Romania (ROU) 1981
16 Jamaica (JAM) 1978 24 Romania (ROU) 1986
17 Jordan (JOR) 1989 25 Russia (RUS) 1991
18 Morocco (MAR) 1983 26 Turkey (TUR) 1981
19 Mexico (MEX) 1982 27 Ukraine (UKR) 1983
20 Panama (PAN) 1983 28 Ukraine (UKR) 2003
21 Peru (PER) 1978 29 Uruguay (URY) 1983
22 Peru (PER) 1984 30 Uruguay (URY) 2003
23 Philippines (PHL) 1983 31 Venezuela (VEN) 1982
24 Poland (POL) 1981 32 Venezuela (VEN) 2004
25 Romania (ROU) 1982 33 South Africa (ZAF) 1985
26 Russia (RUS) 1991 34 South Africa (ZAF) 1989
27 Russia (RUS) 1998 35 South Africa (ZAF) 1993
28 Trinidad and T. (TTO) 1989
29 Turkey (TUR) 1978
30 Uruguay (URY) 1983
31 Venezuela (VEN) 1982
32 Venezuela (VEN) 1995
Trebesch and Zabel (2017)
1 Albania (ALB) 1991
2 Argentina (ARG) 1982
3 Argentina (ARG) 2001
4 Bulgaria (BGR) 1990
5 Brazil (BRA) 1983
6 Chile (CHL) 1983
7 Costa Rica (CRI) 1981
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